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INTRODUCTION
On March 20, 2003, U.S.-led coalition forces
invaded Iraq,' leading to the collapse of the Ba'athist Iraqi
government. On May 1, 2003, the Bush Administration
declared a U.S. victory and expressed the intent to remain
in Iraq, despite the end of "major combat operations," in
order to secure and reconstruct the country. 2
On April 6, 2003, U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary
Paul Wolfowitz announced that the U.S.-run regime would
last at least six months after the war although "probably...
longer."3 According to Wolfowitz, the U.S. would remain
in Iraq to provide food and medicine and to repair and
install infrastructure.4 However, the U.S. demonstrated that
its plan for post-war Iraq has, since its inception, involved
more than "traditional reconstruction," which is temporary
administration of a territory to restore public order and
safety.5
Under the cloak of reconstruction and assistance,
the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
formally instituted extreme investment laws that altered the
very fabric of Iraqi society and denied the Iraqi people a
1 Glenn Kessler, The U.S. Puts a Spin on Coalition Numbers,
WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 21, 2003, at A29.
2 George W. Bush, U.S. President, Address to the Nation on
Iraq From the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, in PUB. PAPERS, May 1, 2003.
28 3 Naomi Klein, Privatization in Disguise, THE NATION, Apr.
28, 2003, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030428&s=klein.
4id.
3 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, art. 43, Oct. 18, 1907, 1907 U.S.T. LEXIS 29, 1 Bevans 631
[hereinafter HAGUE REGULATIONS].
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meaningful opportunity to exercise democracy.6 Though
they have received little press attention in the West, the
CPA's economic reforms have sparked widespread
controversy in Iraq.7 Even some of the CPA's select Iraqi
Council members and members of the Iraqi business
community advised that the US-led privatization measures
in Iraq may cause deeper unrest, danger, and turbulence in
the country and expose Iraq too rapidly to stiff outside
competition, even before implementation of Order 39.g
This article focuses on the substantive investment
law reforms instituted under CPA Order 39 (Order 39) on
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).9 Order 39 creates a
liberal investment regime and moves Iraq from a centrally-
planned economy to a free market system.' Order 39
allows investors unfettered access to Iraq without the
establishment of protective measures required to ensure
sustainable FDI that will protect Iraq's fragile institutions
and aid development through job creation, capital flow
retention, technology transfer, and workforce training."
l
Order 39 permits complete foreign ownership of Iraqi
companies without limitations on remittances, local
ownership requirements, protected sectors, technology
transfer requirements, local employment requirements, or
limits on privatization.12 Order 39 installs a free market
6 See generally Antonia Juhasz, Ambitions of an Empire: The
Bush Administration Economic Plan for Iraq and Beyond, LEFT TURN
MAGAZINE, Jan. 20 2004, available at
http://www.globaipolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/after/2004/0120ambiti
ons.htm
7 Neil King, Jr., Bush Oficials Draft Broad Plan for Free-
Market Economy in Iraq, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2003, at A4.
8 Juhasz, supra note 6.
See Coalition Provisional Authority, Ord. 39, Sept. 19, 2003.
1° Id
11 Id.
12 id.
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system in Iraq, in a form dreamed of by Chicago School
economists, through the complete abolition of current
investment law and a disregard of Iraqi legal and cultural
traditions.' 3 By allowing FDI in all economic sectors of
Iraq, including previously state-owned industries and
entities, Order 39 essentially permits the sale of sovereign
property to foreign interests.14
Order 39 has sparked a large influx of FDI into Iraq
inevitably causing serious environmental, sociopolitical,
and economic impacts, which affect the long-term well-
being of the nation.'5  While FDI can produce beneficial
impacts on host state development, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights has found that trade
liberalization, without adequate safeguards and supervision,
often results in uneven development, exacerbated economic
disparity, and human rights violations.'
6
This article sets out to prove that the CPA, as a
temporary occupying force, does not possess adequate
authority to institute the reforms in Order 39. In Security
Council Resolution 1483 (Resolution 1483), the Security
Council established the legal framework and mandate for
the actions of the CPA in Iraq.' 7 Under Resolution 1483,
13 id
14 Id. § 6. Section 6 of Order 39 states, "[F]oreign investment
may take place with respect to all economic sectors in Iraq, except that
foreign direct and indirect ownership of the natural resources sector
involving primary extraction and initial processing remains prohibited.
In addition, this Order does not apply to banks and insurance
companies." There is no exemption for state owned entities or
industries.
1s See generally Part I of this paper.
16 Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on
Human Rights, Trade, and Investment, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, at 9-10
and 22.
" See S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1493 (May 22, 2003).
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the U.S. and U.K. must act in accordance with the Geneva
Convention IV 1949, the Hague Regulations IV, the U.N.
Charter, and customary international law.' It is the
opinion of this article that these bodies of law prohibit the
reforms effectuated by Order 39, as they appear to violate
humanitarian law, U.S. and U.K. obligations under the
U.N. Charter, and the Iraqis' right to self-determination and
permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR).' 9
The reforms do not promote or advance the human rights of
the Iraqis as required by the U.N. Charter and undermine
the ability of the Iraqis to exercise autonomy over their
economic and political future, natural resources, and
development. 20 The reforms violate Iraqi law, dispose of
sovereign assets, property, and resources, and bind the
Iraqis to contracts previously prohibited to foreign
investors.2'
This article examines the legitimacy and legality of
the reforms contained in Order 39. Part One discusses the
origin and status of the CPA and generally documents the
U.S. and U.K. argument concerning the legitimacy of the
CPA. It further details the reforms under Order 39 and the
manner in which the reforms alter existing Iraqi law.
Part Two specifies the law governing CPA activities
in post-war Iraq and demonstrates that the coalition is an
occupying force according to the Geneva Conventions and
the Hague Regulations, as well as the obligations
incumbent upon the CPA under the legal framework
applicable to the CPA under Resolution 1483. This section
defines the CPA's obligation to act as "usufruct"--in the
18Id
19 See generally Part II of this article.
20 d, see also Part Hl.D of this article.
21 See generally Part HI of this article.
Crurn
54 South Carolina Journal of Vol. 2
International Law and Business 2005 - 2006
best interest of the Iraqis-by utilizing Iraqi assets only for
military necessity and not beyond the term of occupation.
Part Three argues that the CPA lacks the authority
to make the investment law reforms in Order 39. This part
analyzes Resolution 1483, which is asserted by the U.S.-led
coalition as granting them authority to institute Order 39,
and argues that the CPA lacks the authority to institute
investment reforms in Iraq under Resolution 1483. The
second part of this section then argues that even if the CPA
possessed the authority to institute the economic reforms
generally, the specific reforms contained in Order 39
violate the Iraqis' right to self-determination and their right
to PSNR, as well as the U.S. and U.K. obligations under the
Hague Regulations, Geneva Conventions, and U.N.
Charter.
I. THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AuTHORITY
Part One of this section documents the inception
and formal establishment of the CPA. Part Two details the
CPA's leadership, mandate, organizational structure, and
method of governance. This part further details the manner
in which the CPA implements policy. Finally, Part Three
begins by describing the Iraqi law abolished by Order 39
and then explains the content of Order 39 in detail.
A. Origin of the Coalition Provisional Authority
In January 2003, before the war in Iraq, the U.S.
established a domestic Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which was led by
retired U.S. General Jay Garner and designed to plan and
implement post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq.22 The
22 PAUL BOWERS, HOUSE OF COMMONS RESEARCH PAPER
03/51: IRAQ: LAW OF OCCUPATION, 9-10.
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ORHA "was expected to take over de facto administration
of Iraq" while coalition forces dealt with security and
disarmament. 23 The ORHA intended to provide a "rolling
transfer" of U.S. control to an Iraqi Interim Authority.24
On April 8, 2003, Baghdad fell, and President Bush
and Prime Minister Tony Blair issued a joint statement
concerning the post-war control of Iraq expressin5 their
intent to remain in Iraq for an undetermined period. The
U.S. and U.K. declared that the Coalition would work with
the U.N. in post-war Iraq and that the U.N. had a "vital role
to play in the reconstruction. ' 26 However, this statement
appears to contradict the April 6, 2003, statement of U.S.
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz that "there will
be no role for the United Nations in setting up an interim
government in Iraq.",2
7
On May 8, 2003, without the "vital" U.N.
involvement the U.S. and U.K. promised one month earlier,
the U.S. and U.K. informed the Security Council that they
had unilaterally created a Coalition Provisional Authority,
which included the ORHA, to govern Ira% temporarily
under the command and control of the U.S. Thus, the
CPA was created without the approval or involvement of
the U.N., which appears to directly contravene the U.S. and
U.K. promise to the Security Council of U.N. involvement.
23 id.
24 R. Margesson and C. Tarnoff, Iraq: Recent Developments in
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance, CRS Report RL31833,
Apr. 1, 2003, available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL31833.pdf.
23 Joint Statement by U.S. President Bush and U.K. Prime
Minister Blair (April 8, 2003), available at
http://www.usembassy.org.uklpotus03/potus03c.html/.
26 id.
27 Klein, supra note 3.
u U.S. and U.K. Letter to the Security Council. S/2003/538,
May 8,2003.
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B. Nature and Authority of the CPA
After the U.S. and U.K. declared the formation of
the CPA to the Security Council in early May 2003,
President Bush appointed Paul Bremer as head of the CPA.
In May of 2003, shortly after the passage of Resolution
1483, Paul Bremer formally established the CPA by
executing Regulation One under his authority as head of
the CPA, "relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions,"
and the "laws and usages of war."2 9 CPA Regulation One
sets out the nature, powers, process, and scope of the
CPA."
Regulation One states that the object and purpose of
the CPA is to exercise powers of government temporarily,
restore conditions of security and stability, and create
conditions where the Iraqi people can freely determine their
own political future through the restoration and
establishment of national and local institutions.
3 1
Additional goals of the CPA included the facilitation of
"economic recovery" and "sustainable reconstruction and
development" of Iraq. 32  Thus, the CPA's mission was
framed in terms of assisting the Iraqis by facilitating and
advancing their efforts in the reconstruction of Iraq.
Under Regulation One, the CPA was vested with
"all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary
to achieve its objectives," which gave the CPA the power
to override the executive, legislative, and judicial authority
of Iraqi institutions if national bodies opposed or hindered
29 COALmON PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY REG. 1, May 16, 2003
[hereinafter CPA].
30 id.
31 Id. at 1.
32 id.
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the CPA's "objectives." 33  Furthermore, the U.S. alone
would be directly involved in the implementation of CPA
policies. 34 Thus, while the Coalition is often presented as
being multinational in nature, under Regulation One, it
would be led by a U.S. General who was subject to the
direction of the U.S.
The U.S.-led CPA was established as a self-
governing institution with self-proclaimed, complete, and
unfettered authority to govern Iraq. More importantly, the
CPA and its agents would be immune from the Iraqi
judicial and legal process, including prosecution for
unlawful acts of Coalition troops and other agents. 35 Thus,
Iraqis aggrieved by CPA activities would have no effective
remedy against the CPA or its agents. The perpetrators,
including those involved in the prisoner abuse scandal,
would not be subject to Iraqi law and may only face
charges in their home countries.
36
C. Economic Reforms in Iraq and CPA Order 39
Since the commencement of the U.S.-led war
against Iraq, the Bush administration has maintained its
intent to bring democracy and freedom to the Iraqi people.
Inherent in these concepts of democracy and freedom is a
free market economy responsive to the needs of global
business and foreign investment by Western multinational
enterprises (MNEs). The U.S. refers to the process of
33 CPA, supra note 29.
34ld
35 CPA Public Notice Regarding the Status of Coalition,
Foreign Liaison and Contractor Personnel, 26 June 2003, available at
http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/regulations/20030626_20030626_CPANOTICEForeignMis
sionCir.html.pdf
36 Ariana Eunjung Cha and Ellen McCarthy, Prison Scandal
Indicates Gap in Command, WASHINGTON POST, May 5, 2004, at A20.
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making the Iraqi economy responsive to such needs as the
"economic reconstruction of Iraq.' 7
The Bush Administration's philosophy can be well-
summarized in a statement issued by BearingPoint, Inc., a
company awarded contracts worth almost $250 million by
the U.S. to facilitate the economic reconstruction of Iraq.
BearingPoint's goal in Iraq is to "[e]istablish the basic legal
framework for a functioning market economy; taking
appropriate advantage of the unique
opportunity.. .presented by the current configuration of
political circumstances." 38 The "configuration of political
circumstances" is the U.S.'s control of Iraq.39 The contents
of the BearingPoint plan are important because, unlike
other Western companies engaged in discrete Iraqi
reconstruction projects, BearingPoint was paid to "develop
and implement international economic practices aimed at
improving economic governance in Iraq and developing a
policy-enabling environment for private sector-led growth
in the country."40 Thus, BearingPoint's statements may be
understood to reflect a wider U.S. policy agenda in Iraq.
37 President Outlines Steps to Help Iraq Achieve Democracy
and Freedom, Remarks by the President on Iraq and the War on Terror
United States Army War College Carlisle, Pennsylvania, May 24,
2004, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/2004052410.htmi.
39 Juhasz, supra note 6 (citing BearingPoint, Inc., Moving the
Iraqi Economy from Recovery to Sustainable Growth, Statement of
Work, Feb. 21, 2003, available at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/docs/BearingPoint.pdf.)39 id.
40 Press Release, USAID, USAID Awards Economics Contract
for Iraq (Sept. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2004/pr040920.html.
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1. Iraqi Investment Law Existing Pre-Order 39
Prior to the U.S. invasion and implementation of
Order 39, Iraqi law4' consisted of a mix of Islamic and
European legal concepts similar to other Middle Eastern
countries.42 Iraqi investment law was based on a socialist
system of governance that prohibited both the private
ownership of real property and the investment in Iraq by
foreigners who were not resident citizens of Arab
countries.43  However, Iraqi investment law did contain
provisions more liberal than other nations in the Arab
world, reflecting an important compromise and dialogue
between the Islamic, geographical, cultural, and historical
context of Iraq and the needs of modem society.44
2. Content of Order 39
Upon its inception, Order 39 completely abolished
Iraqi investment law concerning the entry, establishment,
and regulation of foreign investors.45 According to its
Preamble, Order 39 aims to change Iraq from a "centrally
planned economy to a market economy characterized by
sustainable economic growth through the establishment of
a dynamic private sector."46 Order 39 also aims to attract
investment into Iraq through the liberalization of Iraqi
investment laws.47  The U.S. maintains that such
liberalizations would increase capital flows into Iraq and
aid Iraqi development through economic growth, and a
41 id
42 Office of the Chief Counsel for International Commerce,
U.S. Department of Commerce, Overview of Overview of Commercial
Law in Iraq, September 12, 2003, at 2-3.43 Id. at 2.
44id.
45 See Ord. 39, supra note 9.
46 Ord. 39, supra note 9, at Preamble.47 id,
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corresponding rise in Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
would improve quality of life.48 The Preamble of Order 39
notes, "facilitating foreign investment will help to develop
infrastructure, foster the growth of Iraqi business, create
jobs, raise capital, result in the introduction of new
technology into Iraq, and promote the transfer of
knowledge and skills to Iraqis." 49 Finally, the Preamble
recognizes the CPA's obligation to "ensure the well-being
of the Iraqi people and enable the social functions and
transactions of everyday life."50
Order 39 consists of five key elements: (1)
privatization of state-owed enterprises; (2) 100% foreign
ownership of businesses in all sectors except oil, mineral
extraction, banks, and insurance companies; (3) "national
treatment" of foreign firms; (4) unrestricted, tax-free
remittance of all funds associated with the investment,
including profits; (5) 40-year renewable ownership
licenses.
a. Privatization
Privatization entails the sale or transfer of
previously state-owned enterprises, assets, or service
entities to the private sector. The production of goods and
the provision of services are shifted from state control to
private control. Order 39 permits total foreign ownership
of state-owned entities in a country which, up until
September 19, 2003, permitted no private ownership of
these entities.52 Under Section Six of Order 39, foreign
Id. See also National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, National
Security Council, Nov. 2005, available at
www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraqstrategynov2005.html.49 Ord. 39, supra note 9.
o Id
S Juhasz, supra note 6.
52 id.
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investment may take place in all sectors and geographic
locations in Iraq except "foreign direct and indirect
ownership of the natural resources sector involving primar!
extraction and initial processing remains prohibited."
3
Accordingly, Order 39 affects over 200 previously state-
owned enterprises, including water services, electric
utilities, schools, hospitals, news media, and prisons.
54
b. One Hundred Percent Foreign Ownership
Unlike investment laws in many countries that
prohibit foreign ownership in certain industries or sectors,
55
Order 39 allows non-Iraqis to completely own businesses
such as factories, farms, telecommunications, and transport
systems.56 Order 39 also allows a foreign investor to
establish a wholly-owned business entity in Iraq, including
a subsidiary of a foreign investor.57 Thus, foreign investors
would not be required to partner or associate with Iraqi
nationals in order to establish businesses in Iraq.
c. National Treatment
Under Order 39, "[a] foreign investor shall be
entitled to make foreign investments in Iraq on terms no
less favorable than those applicable to an Iraqi investor."
58
This national treatment provision protects investors from
discriminatory treatment in Iraq.5  "National treatment
provisions require the state to treat foreign investors and
53 Ord. 39, supra note 9, at § 6.
- Juhasz, supra note 6.
55 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
Foreign Direct Investment and Development, UNCTADIITEIIIT/10
(vol. 1) (1999).
56 1d. at4.
57 Ord. 39, supra note 9, at §§ 6 and 7.
51d. at §4.
59 Id
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investments no less favorably than 'like' domestic investors
and investments once they have crossed the border and are
part of domestic commerce." 60 Thus, the Iraqi government
would be unable to distinguish between the businesses of
foreign investors and Iraqi nationals. For example, under
this provision, Iraq would be unable. to require U.S.
companies to hire local Iraqi workers in construction
projects. 61
d. Unrestricted, Tax Free Remittances
Regulations on the flow of investment related
capital have emerged as an important FDI issue. The more
capital, such as profits from the operations of MNEs, that is
reinvested into the host state, the better the impact on the
host economy.62 On the other hand, when foreign capital
flows and business profits are not reinvested in local
businesses and the local economy, the positive effects of
FDI cannot take root.63 Under Order 39, foreign investors
are authorized to "transfer abroad without delay all funds
associated with investment, including.., shares or profits
and dividends."'64 This rule should be compared to
common investment regulations requiring investors to
reinvest a certain percentage of profits or dividends in the
local business entity, infrastructure, or creation of local
community services because such rules are an essential
6°Id. at §14.
61 Juhasz, supra note 6.
62 Steve Onyiewu and Hermanta Shrestha, Tax Incentives and
Foreign Direct Investment in the MENA Region, Economic Research
Forum 12'h Annual Conference 11, (Dec. 19-21, 2005), Cairo, Egypt,
available at
http://www.erf.org.eg/l 2thAnnualConference/TRADE/presented/Onyei
wu&Shrestha.pdf.
3 id.
6 Ord. 39, supra note 9, at § 11(2).
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component of FDI programs that advance the development
of host countries.
65
Many FDI regimes designed to advance the
development of the host state also include provisions that
restrict the amount of capital that a business can take out of
the economy in a certain period of time.66 The provision in
Order 39 providing for unrestricted tax-free remittances is
inconsistent with the CPA's stated objectives of designing a
system that "improves the conditions of life" and
"opportunities for all" in Iraq.67  The policy does not
maximize the benefits of FDI by requiring foreign business
to better the living conditions of Iraqis by building
infrastructure or creating services.
e. 40-Year Renewable Ownership Licenses
Finally, Order 39 permits the allocation of licenses
for real property for uP to 40 years, which are renewable
for further periods.6  This provision states that an
internationally recognized representative government of
Iraq may review the licenses after it assumes the
responsibilities of the CPA.69 Importantly, this provision
extends the CPA's use of Iraqi land beyond the duration of
the occupation.
70
65 M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INvEsTMENT Ch. 2 (1994).
66 See United Nations Conference, supra not 55
67 Ord. 39, supra note 9, at Preamble.
" Id. at § 8(2).
69id.
70 id
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II. LAW GOVERNING CPA ACTIVITIES IN POST CONFLICT
IRAQ
Part One of this section provides a background
summary of international law on occupation. In it,
"occupation" under international law is defined which leads
to the determination that the CPA is a belligerent
occupying force. Part Two generally describes the law
governing the CPA's obligations as a belligerent occupant
and focuses on Resolution 1483 in particular. Furthermore,
this part applies Section III of the Hague Regulations,
Articles 42-56 and Section III of the Geneva Convention
IV, Articles 47-78. Finally, Part Three describes the
applicability of other laws to the CPA's actions in Iraq,
specifically the law referenced or implicated by Resolution
1483, which includes the customary international human
right to self-determination and right to sovereignty over
natural resources.
A. Background
Because different designations and legal rules apply
to different circumstances, international law distinguishes
between various types of political governance based on the
origin and nature of the governing authority.71 Changes in
the political sphere or "rulership," such as domestic
revolutions not involving the assumption of control by
another state, are designated as "changes in government."
2
Whereas, changes in "rulership" involving "assumption of
control by another state" are considered "territorial
changes" or "post war" changes. 73 Thus, a change in the
political nature of a state resulting from a war is not the
71 ERNST H. FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 4 (1942).721d.
73 Id.
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same as a change in political makeup resulting from a
revolution where a new sovereign entity emerges. "A
territorial change obtained by a belligerent during and in
the course of war is not treated as a state succession but as
an occupation." 74 That is, sovereignty does not pass to the
occupier.
Thus, the nature of the relationship between the
occupier and the occupied is not the same as that between a
new successor and its populace. According to international
law, an occupied territory will retain its sovereignty
although it is not in a position to conduct its own affairs.
Therefore, the laws governing occupation will affect
virtually every aspect of the occupied territory, including
its economic policies, institutions, laws, politics, social
sphere, and populace of the occupied territory.
Resolution 1483 specifically calls upon the U.S. and
U.K. to "comply fully with their obligations under
international law, including in particular the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of
1907. "76 The Hague Convention IV (1907), its annexed
regulations (Hague Regulations), and the Geneva
Convention IV (1949) (Geneva Convention) are the main
sources of treaty law on occupation.77 Article 2 of the
Geneva Convention expressly states that the convention
applies to all cases of partial or total occupation of the
territory even if the said occupation meets with no armed
74 Id. at 5, § 11. See also EYAL BENVENISTI, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION, Princeton, 1993 (discussing the
legal status of other occupations).751d. at4.
76 S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 17, at Item 5.
" BOWERs, supra note 22, at 19. Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GENEVA CONVENTION]; See
also HAGUE REGULATIONS, supra note 5.
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resistance. 78  Similarly, Section HI of the Hague
Regulations sets forth the provisions relating to
occupation.79 However, under Resolution 1483, the U.N.
Charter and "other relevant international law" also govern
the CPA.80
The U.N. Charter requires the U.S. and U.K., inter
alia, to endeavor "to establish conditions under which
justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties
and other sources of international law can be maintained"
and promote higher standards of living and human rights.
81
Although Resolution 1483 does not designate what
constitutes other relevant international law, other applicable
rules of law include obligations incumbent upon states
78 GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 77, at art. 2.79 HAGUE REGULATIONS, supra note 5, at § 3.
so S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 17, at 4. This provision "calls
upon the Authority, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations
and other relevant international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi
people through the effective administration of the territory, including in
particular working towards the restoration of conditions of security and
stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can
freely determine their own political future." Id. According to the
Restatement of the Law 3d: Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
Article 102, "(1) a rule of international law is one that has been
accepted as such by the international community of states (a) in the
form of customary law; (b) by international agreement; or (c) by
derivation from general principles common to the major legal systems
of the world. (2) Customary international law results from a general
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation. (3) International agreements create law for the states parties
thereto and may lead to the creation of customary international law
when such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally
and are in fact widely accepted. (4) General principles common to the
major legal systems, even if not incorporated or reflected in customary
law or international agreement, may be invoked as supplementary rules
of international law where appropriate." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, art. 102.
8 1U.N. CHARTER, art. 55, at Preamble.
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under treaties to which they are a party and obligations
under customary international law.8 2  This topic is
addressed more fully in Section D below. However, this
article focuses on the customary international law rights to
permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the
international right to self-determination in the context of
the occupation of Iraq.
The Hague Regulations thoroughly address the
economic law of occupation.8 3  Eleven of the fifteen
articles of the Hague Regulations on occupation
specifically address economic questions.84  For example,
Article 55 of the Hague Regulations requires an occupying
power to safeguard the capital of state properties, public
buildings, and estates, while Articles 48-49 govern the
collection of taxes by an occupying power, and Article 53
limits the type of state assets an occupying power may take
and use for military purposes.85  Purely economic
provisions are contained in Articles 46-56 of the Hague
Regulations, and Articles 42 and 43 address economic and
non-economic interests.
8 6
Furthermore, the Geneva Convention provisions on
occupied territories also incorporate economic concerns
into general provisions on occupation, such as Article 52,
which prohibits contracts, agreements, or regulations that
impair the rights of workers and preserves work
82 For discussions interpreting other relevant international law
applicable to the occupation context see Karima Bennoune, Toward a
Human Rights Approach to Armed Conflict: Iraq 2003, 11 U.C. DAVIS
J. INT'L L. POL'Y 171 (2004); John Yoo, Iraqi Reconstruction and the
Law of Occupation, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. POL'Y 7 (2004).
83 Id. at 9. See generally HAGUE REGULATIONS, supra note 5,
at arts. 42-56; GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 77, at arts. 47-76.
84 HAGUE REGULATIONS, supra note 5, at arts. 42-56.
85Id. at arts. 48-49, 53, 55.
6 Id.
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opportunities for persons residing in the occupied
territory. 7  However, the Hague Regulations address
economic issues in a more targeted and isolated manner.
88
B. Occupation Defined
An occupier who controls a territory by force is
deemed a "belligerent occupant."8 9  A "territory is
considered occupied when it is actually placed under the
authority of the hostile army."' 90 This occurs when the
government of the territory is no longer capable of exerting
authority. 9' However, the occupation extends only to the
territory over which authority is exercised, even if the
occupation meets with no armed resistance.
92
Four general characteristics describe a belligerent
occupation: (1) imposition by a belligerent state; (2) upon
the territory of a belligerent state; (3) during armed
conflict; (4) commencing before the conclusion of an
armistice. 93 Furthermore, the Hague Regulations will apply
where one belligerent overruns a part of a territory
belonging to an enemy state, where both armies are still
87 GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 77, at art. 52.
so Id. See also ERIC CARLTON, OCCUPATION: THE POLICIES
AND PRACTICES OF MILITARY CONQUERORS (1992).
89 Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Occupation of Iraq: What
International Law Requires Now, (Apr. 17, 2003), available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnewl07.php; see generally Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, ICJ Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. (July 9).
90 HAGUE REGULATIONS, supra note 5, at art. 42. Please note
that the term "hostile army" is not defined in the Hague Regulations.
91 Id.
92 ADAM ROBERTS, WHAT IS MILITARY OCCUPATION 55
(British Year Book of International Law 260) (1984).93 Id.
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fighting in the field, and where no armistice or other
agreement has been concluded.94
The U.S.-led Coalition meets the elements of a
belligerent occupant described above for the following
reasons. First, the Coalition imposed its military presence
upon the territory of Iraq in the form of an armed conflict.
Second, although President Bush had declared an end to
formal warfare, the U.S. continued to maintain its control
of Iraqi territory through the use of force and arguably
against the will of many of the Iraqi people. Third, no
armistice or other agreement has been concluded between
the Coalition and the Iraqis. Finally, the Coalition controls
a significant if not complete portion of Iraqi territory in
such a manner so as to deprive the Iraqis of the ability to
administer their territory independently. Consequently,
strong evidence exists for the argument that the Coalition is
an occupying force. In fact, "shortly after replacing Jay
Garner in Iraq as head of the CPA, Ambassador Paul
Bremer did acknowledge the applicability of occupation
law.
95
The rights and duties of an occupying force under
the Geneva and Hague Conventions are not affected by the
aim or legality of the initial use of force or whether the
presence of the hostile army is called an "invasion,"
"liberation," "administration," or "occupation."96 "As the
law of occupation is primarily motivated by humanitarian
considerations, it is solely the facts on the ground that
94 id
" Conor McCarthy, The Paradox of the International Law on
Military Occupation, 10 J. CONFLICT & SECURiTY L. 43, 45 n.9 (2005).
96 International Committee of the Red Cross, Occupation and
International Humanitarian Law: Questions and Answers, available at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmIaIV634KFC;
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determine its application."97 Thus, the fact that the U.S.
claims to be a liberating force in Iraq does not affect the
applicability of these obligations to the Coalition under
international law.
98
The duties of an occupying power exist regardless
of the legality of the initial use of force that gave rise to the
occupation.99 An occupying power, "by virtue of its de
facto military control, gains 'authority of legitimate power.'
In exchange, the occupying power must 'take all the
measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as
possible, public order and safety."' 00  Also, an occupying
power must respect the laws in force in the country,
101
which, in this case, includes Irac's right to territorial
integrity and political independence.
Commentary to the Geneva Convention clarifies
this duty under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and
states that Article 43 of the Hague Regulations "is not
applicable only to the inhabitants of the occupied territory;
it also protects the separate existence of the State, its
institutions and its laws. This provision does not become in
any way less valid because of the existence of the new
[Geneva] Convention which merely amplifies [Art. 43 of
the Hague Regulations] in so far as the question of the
97 id.
" Davis P. Goodman, The Need for Fundamental Change in
the Law oBelligerent Occupation, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1573 (1985).
Frederic L. Kirgis, Security Council Resolution 1483,
Rebuilding ofIraq, ASIL INSIGHTS, May 2003.
Batram S. Brown, Intervention, Self-determination,
Democracy and the Residual Responsibilities of the Occupying Power
in Iraq, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. POL'Y 23 (2004).
101 HAGUE REGULATION, supra note 5, at art. 43; GENEVA
CONVENTION, supra note 77, at art. 47.
102 Brown, supra note 100.
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protection of civilians is concerned."' 0 3 Thus, there is no
question about the scope and importance of Article 43,
pursuant to which the US may not undermine the political
independence of Iraq by destroying and replacing all of
Iraq's institutions.
The Preamble of Resolution 1483 recognizes the
U.S. and U.K. as "occupying powers" and calls on them to
comply fully with their obligations under international law,
including the Geneva Conventions and the Hague
Regulations.'°4 Furthermore, in the letter of May 8, 2003,
from the U.S. and U.K. to the Security Council, the two
states pledged to abide by their obligations under
international law.'05 Thus, the U.S. is fully aware that it is
obliged to meet the obligations described above under the
Geneva Convention and Hague Regulations and
international law.
C. Applicable Law When Occupation Exists
Four basic principles of international law underlie
the existence of an occupation: (1) the occupying power
does not gain sovereignty over the occupied territory
through occupation; (2) occupation is a transitory phase
wherein the rights of the population must be respected by
the occupying power until formal authority is restored; (3)
when exercising authority, the occupying power must
observe the interests of the inhabitants; (4) the occupying
power must not use its authority to exploit the population or
local resources for the benefit of its own population and
103 Commentary to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 273-4 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958).
104 S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 17, at Preamble.
105 U.N. Doc. S/2003/538 May 8, 2003. Letter from the
Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United
States of America Addressed to the President of the Security Council.
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territory. 0 6  Furthermore, provisions allowing an
occupying power to utilize resources or assets of an
occupied territory must be narrowly construed. 10 7 These
rules demonstrate that occupying powers may not use their
status as occupier to advance their own hegemonic interests
by, for example, installing an economic regime that furthers
its own political-economic agenda on the international
level.
Under international law, despite the current
occupation, the Iraqi people still possess sovereignty over
their territory108 This concept is reinforced by Resolution
1483 and the U.S. and U.K. letter to the Security Council,
both of which acknowledge the continued territorial
sovereignty of Iraq. 10 9 Under the Hague Regulations,
occupiers must take all measures "to restore, and ensure, as
far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting,
unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country." 110  The Geneva Convention expresses the same
principle.'' Occupying forces are "absolutely prevented"
from making such changes, unless the changes are essential
for the occupier to maintain public order, safety, orderly
government, and security. 112 Thus, the CPA should be
106 Human Rights Watch, The War in Iraq and International
Humanitarian Law, available at
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/iraq/ihlfaqoccupation.htm. HAGUE
REGULATIONS, supra note 5, at art. 42-55, GENEVA CONVENTION,
supra note 77, at art. 47-81.
107 THOMAS ERSKINE HOLLAND, THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND
53 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1907).
log Eyal Benvenisti, Water Conflicts During the Occupation of
Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 860, 862 (2003).
'09 See U.N. Doc. S/2003/538, supra note 105; Letter, supra
note 105.
110 HAGUE REGULATIONS, supra note 5, at art. 43.
"1 GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 77, at art. 63.
112id.
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forbidden from altering Iraqi laws or institutions in a
manner contrary to existing Iraqi law.
With respect to property and the economy,
occupying powers may take possession of cash, funds,
realizable securities belonging to the state, and real
property to be used for military operations. 13 However,
"private property must be respected," including proprietary
rights granted in state contracts. 14  Thus, contracts
concluded between the occupied territory and foreign
private parties should still be binding and enforceable.
"Absent specific authorization in the existing laws of Iraq
or military necessity, the Occupying Powers are prohibited
from nullifying-and, arguably, suspending-any
legitimate state contracts with foreign parties by amending
Iraq's laws or by issuing a legislative declaration to that
effect.''115 Therefore, while occupiers may confiscate
private property of the enemy in certain circumstances, the
private property of foreign non-belligerents should not be
confiscated under any circumstances.
16
If an occupying force "directly appropriates
property rights lawfully acquired by foreign parties under
Iraqi law" or "renders the economic benefit of such right
meaningless," aggrieved parties have a right to
compensation under established principles of international
113 HAGUE REGULATIONS, supra note 5, at art. 53.
"4 Pieter H.F. Bekker, The Legal Status of Foreign Economic
Interests in Occupied Iraq, ASIL INSIGHTS, Jul. 2003, available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh 114.htm (quoting HAGUE
REGULATIONS art. 46); See also Jordan J. Paust, The U.S. as Occupying
Power Over Portions of Iraq and Relevant Responsibilities under the
Laws of War, ASIL INSIGHTS, Apr. 2003, available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh102.htm.
'11 Bekker, supra note 114.
116 Id.
Crumn
74 South Carolina Journal of Vol. 2
International Law and Business 2005 - 2006
law regarding the expropriation of foreign property.
1 17
Occupying forces violating this rule are liable to pay
compensation to injured parties. is For example, the
Security Council specifically required Iraq to pay damages
for any direct harm done to the property and territory of
Kuwait during Iraq's "unlawful invasion and
occupation."'"19 Thus, harm caused to Iraqi assets by the
CPA may require compensation by Coalition members.
Regarding public buildings, real estate, and natural
resources owned by and situated in the occupied country,
occupiers "shall be regarded only as administrator and
usufructuary" of such properties.' 0 Therefore, occupiers
may make use of them but may not take title. According to
the Army Field Manual, Chapter 6, Section 5, occupiers
cannot damage or destroy property in the occupied territory
unless the destruction is absolutely necessary and may not
exercise these rights in a wasteful or negligent manner that
seriously decreases their value. 12 The occupant may let or
utilize public land and buildings but cannot contract or
lease beyond the conclusion of the war. 122 Furthermore,
the U.S. State Department has opined, "[i]ntemational law
does not support the assertion of a right in the occupant to
grant an oil development concession." 2 1 Thus, the US
may not contract with foreign multinational enterprises for
the sale or use of Iraqi assets or resources unless it is
absolutely required to do so and such activity is designed
117 id.
118 Id.
119 U.N. SCOR RES. 687 16 (Apr. 3, 1991).2 HAGUE REGULATIONS, supra note 5, at art. 55
121 United States Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land
Warfare, Chapter 6, section 5, available at
http://faculty.ed.umuc.edu/-nstanton/FM27-1 0.htm.
122id
123 U.S. Dept. of State, Memorandum of Law (Oct. 1 1976), 16
ILM 733, 752 (1977).
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to, and actually does, aid the Iraqi people. However, in any
event, the U.S. may not enter contracts that extend beyond
the duration of the conflict.
While humanitarian law protects the economic law
of occupied territories, there are gaps in the protection
afforded to the populations of socialist states, like the
Iraqis, from economic colonization and exploitation by
occupiers. For example, under the Hague Regulations,
private property is afforded greater protection than public
property during occupation. 24  In a state where most
property is state-owned, this poses a problem. However, as
demonstrated below, Resolution 1483, in its reference to
other applicable law, filled in the gaps in the protections
afforded to private property under the Hague Regulations
and Geneva Convention. That is, principles of customary
international law regarding the right to self-determination
and the right of a state to permanent sovereignty over
natural resources require occupying powers to respect the
property rights of inhabitants.'' Rules on the preservation
of sovereignty and the prohibition of sale, lease, or disposal
of land by an occupying force to exceed the duration of the
occupation should make the contracts facilitated by Order
39 unenforceable after the termination of the occupation.
Thus, even if some gaps exist, Resolution 1483's reference
to "other relevant international law," which includes
applicable customary international law, fills the gaps, and
the CPA would still lack the authority to facilitate or
execute contracts in Iraq under Order 39.
D. Other Applicable Law Referenced by Resolution 1483
The notion that human rights law is only applicable
in times of peace and that, in times of war and occupation,
124 HAGUE REGULATIONS, supra note 5, at arts. 46, 53, 56.
125 See generally infra, Part II.D.2 of this article.
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the law of human rights yields to the "lex specialis of the
laws of war" is no longer accurate.'2 Many times the
worst violations of human rights occur during war and
occupation, and it is during those times that the observance
of international human rights standards is most
important. 27  It is now a generally accepted norm of
customary international law that international human rights
are applicable in times of war and occupation, as reflected
in statements by the U.N., scholars, and international
human rights instruments. 12
8
In Resolution 1483, the Security Council, for the
first time under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, addressed
the presence of the U.S. and U.K. in post-conflict Iraq.
While Resolution 1483 does not address the legality of the
original use of force in Iraq, which many believe to have
been unlawful, 12 9 it recognizes the U.S. and U.K. as
occupying powers and establishes the legal framework and
mandate for those participating in the administration and
reconstruction of Iraq in order to "promote the welfare of
the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the
territory." 30 Notably, Resolution 1483 calls upon not just
the CPA, but "all concerned," to "comply fully with their
obligations under international law, including in particular
the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Regulations."' 131
12 Christopher Greenwood, Rights at the Frontier: Protecting
the Individual in Time of War, in LAW AT THE CENTRE: THE INSTITUTE
OF ADVANCED LEGAL STUDIES AT FIFTY 278 (B.A.K. Rider ed., 1999).127 id.
t' Id"
12 Mary Ellen O'Connell, Addendum to Armed Force in Iraq:
Issues of Legality, ASIL INSIGHTS, Apr. 2003, available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh99al.htm
130 S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 17, at 4.
131Id. at 5.
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Furthermore, Resolution 1483 conceives of the
international community's significant involvement in the
reconstruction process. 132 For example, Paragraph One of
Resolution 1483 appeals to U.N. member states and
concerned organizations to "assist the people of Iraq in
their efforts to reform their institutions and rebuild their
country, and to contribute to conditions of stability and
security in Iraq in accordance with [Resolution 1483].' ' 3
Also, Paragraph Four of the Preamble "[riesolves that the
United Nations should play a vital role in humanitarian
relief, the reconstruction of Iraq, and the restoration and
establishment of national and local institutions for
representative governance."' 3 4 Thus, it appears that the
Security Council envisioned that the international
community would be involved in the reconstruction
process, which should inform the spirit in which the
provisions defining the scope of the CPA's authorized
activities in Iraq should be read.
Paragraph Four of Resolution 1483 sets forth the
primary purposes of the CPA. Furthermore, Resolution
1483 calls upon all U.N. members to assist in the
reconstruction of Iraq "in accordance" with Resolution
1483.13 As U.N. members, the U.S. and U.K. must obey
the legal framework and mandate established by the
Security Council both individually and through
organizations of which they are a part. 3 Resolution 1483
specifically stresses that the U.S. and U.K. "promote the
welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective
administration of the territory, including the creation of
conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine
132 S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 17.
13id at l.
134 1d. 4.
135 id. 1.
136U.N. CHARTER Ch. VII, art. 48.
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their own political future" as soon as possible.
137
Resolution 1483 stresses the need for the respect and
observance of Iraq's religious, cultural, and historical
heritage, and obliges the occupying powers to "promote the
welfare of the Iraqi people," and to disperse the funds
obtained for reconstruction for purposes "benefiting the
people of Iraq."' 138  Additionally, the CPA is called upon
to assist in the promotion of human rights' 39 and to
recognize the right of Iraqis to determine their own political
future, 140 as all U.N. member states are required to do
under Article 55 of the U.N. Charter.
14 1
In fulflling these duties, Resolution 1483 expressly
binds the U.S. and U.K. to the U.N. Charter and "other
relevant rules of international law," the Geneva Convention
and Hague Regulations. Resolution 1483 recognizes the
right of Iraqis to sovereignty over their natural resources
and political, social, and economic future. Thus, under the
specific terms of the Resolution, the CPA is bound by both
the law of occupation, which has already been discussed,
and the obligations under international law generally, as
Resolution 1483 specifically applies the U.N. Charter,
" S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 17, at Preamble 4.
38 1d. at 14.
39 Id. at 8(g).
140 S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 17, at Preamble 14.
141 U.N. CHARTER art. 55 states, "With a view to the creation
of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for
peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United
Nations shall promote: (a) higher standards of living, full employment,
and conditions of economic and social progress and development; (b)
solutions of international economic, social, health, and related
problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion."
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"other relevant international law," and "international law"
to the actions of the CPA in Iraq.
1. Application of Human Rights Law to Occupied
Territories Generally
The first part of this section demonstrates the
applicability of customary international human rights law
to the context of occupation generally. It then seeks to
identify the two customary international law rights
implicated by Resolution 1483 and Order 39-the right to
self-determination and the right to permanent sovereignty
over natural resources. Finally, it concludes by describing
the scope and nature of these rights and their significance
with respect to occupation.
Customary international law norms of human rights
law can now be said to apply universally to all
circumstances. 142 Customary international law consists of
rules applicable to states that developed over time and are
evidenced by state practice supported by evidence that
states observe the rule due to a perceived obligation to do
so. 143  While the international law on occupation and
142 John Quigley, The Relation Between Human Rights Law
and The Law of Belligerent Occupation: Does an Occupied Population
Have A Right to Freedom of Assembly and Expression?, 12 B.C. INT'L
& CoMP L. REv. 1, 3 (1989).
143 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700. According to the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, (1)
Whether a rule has become international law is determined by evidence
appropriate to the particular source from which that rule is alleged to
derive. (2) In determining whether a rule has become international law,
substantial weight is accorded to (a) judgments and opinions of
international judicial and arbitral tribunals; (b) judgments and opinions
of national judicial tribunals; (c) the writings of scholars; (d)
pronouncements by states that undertake to state a rule of international
law, when such pronouncements are not seriously challenged by other
states. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
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international human rights law developed as separate
bodies of law, the two have come together. 44 Thus, it is
now widely accepted as a customary international law norm
that human rights law continues to operate in occupied
territories. 
45
This notion is a direct result of developments in
international law over the past century and has been
expressed by, inter alia, the U.N. General Assembly,
146
U.N. Secretary General, U.N. Human Rights Committee,
147
countless legal scholars, and the European Court of Human
Rights. 48 For example, in a report on human rights and
armed conflict, the Secretary General of the U.N. stated,
"[t]he human rights provisions of the Charter make no
distinction in regard to their application as between times
of peace ...and times of war" and that the provisions
cover persons living in territories under belligerent
occupation.' 49 The U.N. Secretary General construed the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) to apply
during wartime, stating that the UDHR does not distinguish
between times of peace and times of armed conflict, as it
sets forth rights and freedoms belonging to everyone,
including those living under occupation.5 °  The U.S.
Department of State has reinforced this assertion, stating "a
central goal of U.S. foreign policy has been the promotion
UNITED STATES, art. 103 (Sources of International Law)
144 Greenwood, supra note 126, at 281.
145 Benevisti, supra note 108, 863.
146 Basic Principles for the Protection of Civilian Population in
Armed Conflicts. G.A. Res. 2675 256 Session (Dec 9, 1970).
147 Concluding Observations of the U.N. Human Rights
Committee: Israel, Aug. 18, 1998.
148 See Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), 108 ILR 443 (1996)
(ECHR).
49 Report of the U.N. Secretary General, 24 U.N. GAOR (No.
61) UNDoc A/7720 at 12, 23 (1969) (emphasis added).150Quigley, supra note 142, at 3.
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of respect for human rights, as embodied in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. The United States
understands that the existence of human rights helps secure
the peace, deter aggression, promote the rule of law,
combat crime and corruption, strengthen democracies, and
prevent humanitarian crises."''
The European Court of Human Rights expressly
stated that the European Convention on Human Rights
applies to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by
contracting states when a contracting state exercises
effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants
abroad as a consequence of military occupation.
5 2
Furthermore, the Assembly has repeatedly stated that it is
guided generally by "the principles embodied in the U.N.
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenants on Human Rights and accepted
humanitarian rules as set out in the Geneva
Conventions."'
5 3
The U.N. Committee for Human Rights stated that a
state party to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) can be held accountable for
violations of the convention committed by a state party on
.3 U.S. Department of State on "Human Rights", available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr.
152 Bankovic v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2001) (Dec. on Admis.), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm; see also Loizidou, 108
ILR at 443.
... U.N. G.A. Res. 46/136 on the Situation of Human Rights in
Afghanistan, Preamble. International Committee of the Red Cross
Statement on Humanitarian Law and Human Rights; U.N. G.A. Res.
46/135 on the Human Rights in Kuwait under Iraqi Occupation; and
U.N. G.A. Dec. 47/133 on the Protection of People Against Forced
Disappearances.
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the territory of another state. 154  The U.S. and U.K. are
parties to this convention and, therefore, must respect their
ICCPR obligations in Iraq. 15 5  Additionally, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has reinforced this
declaration, stating that the protections of the ICCPR do
"not cease in times of war, except . . . whereby certain
provisions may be derogated from in time of national
emergency."'15 Both the ICCPR Human Rights Committee
and other bodies monitoring states' implementation of
human rights obligations under treaties they have ratified
"have consistently ruled that such obligations extend to any
territory in which a state exercises jurisdiction or control,
including territories occupied as a result of military
action."' 3 Thus, the U.S. is bound to recognize and abide
by the applicable human rights standards in these
instruments while acting as the occupying force in Iraq.
2. Specific Customary International Law Standards
Applicable to the CPA and Occupied Inhabitants of Iraq
While Resolution 1483's reference to other
"relevant international law" implicates many rights and
duties the CPA must observe, this article focuses on the
right to self-determination and the right to permanent
sovereignty over natural resources.' 58 These rights have
been focused on because first, they are foundational rights
required for the exercise and enjoyment of other human
1-5 Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, 68 ILR 29, 38 (1981).
155 See generally United Nations Office of the High
Commissioner (listing all parties that have ratified ICCPR), available
at www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
136 Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 ICJ
Rep. 226, 240 (1996).
157 Amnesty International, Memorandum: Concerns Relating
to International Human Rights and the Occupation of Iraq, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engmde 41572003.
151 S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 17, at 4.
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rights enshrined in the U.N. Charter, other human rights
treatises, and established principles of customary
international law. 159  Second, these rights are both
acknowledged by Resolution 1483 and Order 39.
a. Right to Self-Determination
The right to self-determination is a fundamental
human right that developed in the context of the
disintegration of colonialism and the recognition of the
rights and autonomy of previously colonized peoples and
individuals. 160 The ICJ defines "self-determination" as
"the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of
peoples."' 16 1 Self-determination entails the freedom to
freely determine one's political status and freely pursue
one's economic, social, and cultural development.
162
Furthermore, the right to self-determination can be
implicated by the actions of an occupying force that affect
the economic system or political process of an occupied
area. 63 The right will apply to peoples, individuals, and
nations under occupation who inhabit a historically
recognized territory.164  Moreover, the right to self-
determination entails the right of inhabitants to resist
159 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 81.
160 ICCPR, art. 1.1 (1966); Karen Parker, Understanding Self-
Determination: The Basics, Presentation to First International
Conference on the Right to Self-Determination, United Nations,
Geneva, August 2000, available at
http://www.webcom.com/hrin/parker/selfdet.html.
161 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004, ICJ Advisory
Opinion. Namibia Advisory Opinion, 1971 ICJ Rep. 16, 31 (1971).
162 U.N. G.A. Res. 1514 (1960).
1,63 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 159.
'64 Hugo Rojas, Cluster I. Stop Cultural Exclusions (in
Chile)!: Reflections on the Principle of Multiculturalism, 55 FLA. L.
REv. 121, 139 (2003).
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occupation by all available legal means, including lawful
applications of force. 165
The right to self-determination has also been
identified as a prerequisite for the exercise of other human
rights. 166  This right is enshrined in the U.N. Charter,
ICCPR, International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), other conventions, and U.N.
Resolutions. The U.N. Charter identifies self-
determination as foundational to the U.N. system, which is
"based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples."'167 Although the right to self-
determination as a rule of international law initially
emerged in the context of colonialism, the right has evolved
to cover individuals and peoples living in occupied
territories. 168 According to the General Assembly of the
U.N., occupied populations must be "protected not just by
humanitarian law, but by insistence upon the right to self-
determination."' 169 Therefore, self-determination should not
be denied to persons or peoples on the basis of perceived
insufficient social, political, or economic development.
70
The primary objective of self-determination is to
"ensure the right of peoples to the necessary level of
autonomy that would guarantee the support of their own
cultural identity, the establishment of priorities by the
community's internal decision-making processes, and the
management of collective matters by themselves."'17
However, "the right to maintain a cultural identity is not
165 id
'1id.
167 U.N. CHARTER, art. 1 2.
169 ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 116 (1994).
169 id.
170 U.N. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII) (1962).
171 Rojas, supra note 164, at 149.
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limited to the right to maintain peoples' distinctive cultural
features, but rather to maintain its capacity for autonomous
decisions.' 172 Article 27 of the UDHR arguably recognizes
this right, stating: "Everyone has the right to participate
freely in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts
and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits."'
173
This sentiment is echoed by Judge Higgins who
observed, "[s]elf-determination has never simply meant
independence. It has meant free choice of peoples."'
174
According to Higgins, although the right to political
independence is often highlighted with respect to self-
determination, it is more than the right to freely determine
political status, rather, "the entitlement is also to 'freely
pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development."" 75
The right of self-determination should also extend
to the choice of economic system within a state, an issue
particularly relevant to post-war Iraq.176 The changes made
by Order 39 in Iraq instituted an economic regime that the
Iraqi people did not approve and, importantly, cannot easily
change, thus depriving the Iraqis of the right to pursue their
political, economic, and social development in the future.
177
The influx of Western multinationals and the institution of
a neoliberal economic regime will create a power structure
in Iraq that may not be easily dismantled by a future
democratically elected Iraqi government.
1" UDHR, art. 27.
174 HIGGINs, supra note 168, at 119.
17 1 Id. at 120.
6 Id. at 123.
17 Ord. 39, supra note 9 (noting that Order 39 was a product
of unilateral action of the Coalition and Iraqi people didn't vote on it).
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b. Right to Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources
The right to PSNR recognizes the harm resulting
from the activities of corporations and occupying powers in
occupied territories. 17  Opportunist companies and
governments frequently use the weakened state of occupied
territories to further their own economic interests to the
detriment of the often economically fragile host state.
179
The right of states and peoples to PSNR is accepted by the
international community as a requirement for the exercise
of the right to self-determination and other fundamental
human rights as reflected by, for example, General
Assembly Resolutions and the ICCPR. 8 0
The General Assembly formalized the right to
PSNR as "the recognition of the inalienable right of all
states freely to dispose of their natural wealth and resources
in accordance with their national interests, and on respect
for the economic independence of States."'' Similarly, the
ICCPR Article 1(2) states, "all peoples may, for their own
ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of
international economic co-operation, based upon the
principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no
case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence."'g2 Therefore, the right to PSNR is very
important to the people of Iraq due to the great wealth of
natural resources of the country and the extreme interest of
1o7s See generally NICOLAAS JAN SCHRUVER, SOVEREIGNTY
OVER NATURAL RESOURCES: BALANCING RIGHTS AND DUTIES CH. 5
(1997).
179 See U.N. G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI) (1974).
1o SCHRUJVER, supra note 178; see also U.N. G.A. Res. 1803.
'.. U.N. G.A. Res. 1803. U.N. G.A. Res. 626. This is
perceived as the genesis of PSNR. See also U.N. G.A. Res. 57/269.
182 ICCPR art. 1(2).
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Western governments and multinationals in acquiring or
controlling such resources.
The right to PSNR extends to all national "resources
and wealth" of developing nations and populations,
including those living under foreign occupation."" Under
this right, states have the legal obligation to combat and
redress the infringement of their economic sovereignty
arising from oppressive and inequitable contracts and other
arrangements "that inevitably occur in the context of
colonization or occupation."' 4 According to the General
Assembly, the exploration, development, and disposition of
resources and the import of foreign capital in developing
states must occur under conditions freely chosen by the
population.' 5  The right to PSNR includes the right to
"restitution and full compensation for the exploitation and
depletion of, and damages to, the natural resources and all
other resources of those states, territories and peoples."'
8 6
The international community, through the General
Assembly and the ICCPR, has dealt with the right to PSNR
in the context of occupation and recognized the unique
corresponding problems for national wealth. These issues
are central to an assessment of the legality of Order 39.
III. BASIS OF THE ILLEGALITY OF ORDER 39
This section analyzes the legitimacy of CPA
economic reforms in Iraq under Resolution 1483 and the
argument that Resolution 1483 authorizes the reforms in
Order 39. The first part of this section situates the Order
"o U.N. G.A. Res. 3336. See also Letter dated 29 January
2002 from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal
Counsel, addressed to the President of the Security Council, availible at
http://www.arso.org/Olaeng.pdf.
t8 id.
185 See HIGGiNs, supra note 168; SCHRIJVER, supra note 178.
1S HiGGiNs, supra note 168.
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39 reforms in the context of U.S. foreign and economic
policy and explains how the reforms create a domestic
investment model for Iraq. The section then analyzes the
model established by Order 39 and its purported benefits
and impacts in light of U.S. and U.K. obligations under the
U.N. Charter and the Iraqis' right to self-determination and
PSNR. Finally, the section applies the rules of occupation
to Order 39, concluding that the reforms are prohibited
under the Geneva Convention and Hague Regulations.
A. Resolution 1483 and CPA Legitimacy
1. The U.S. Position on Resolution 1483 and the CPA's
Ability to Institute Structural Investment Law Reforms in
Post-War Iraq
According to the U.S., the current occupation of
Iraq followed a legitimate use of force that was "fully
justified, and expressly recognized under Security Council
Resolution 1483. 'd s7 Furthermore, the U.S. argues that
Resolution 1483 enables it to institute structural reforms
such as those under Order 39.188 This resolution calls upon
the CPA to "promote the welfare of the Iraqi people
through the effective administration of the territory,"
including "working towards the restoration of conditions of
security and stability and the creation of conditions in
which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own
political future."' The CPA maintains that a neo-liberal,
free market system is essential for the exercise of freedom
and democracy and that without such an economic system,
187 James C. Ho, International law and the Liberation of Iraq,
8 TEx. REV. LAW & POL. 79, 83 (2003) referencing Sec of State Colin
Powell, Press Conference on Iraq Declaration (Dec 19, 2002) available
at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/l 6123.htm.
188 Id.189 Ord. 39, supra note 9, at 4.
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the Iraqis cannot freely determine their security, stability,
and political future.' 90
The U.S. also argues that Resolution 1483 requires
the U.S. to take actions in Iraq not typically required of
occupying powers.' 91 Accordingly, the U.S. appears to
believe that Resolution 1483 overrides the existing
international law of occupation, allowing it to take actions
in Iraq that it otherwise could not take, such as the
structural investment law reforms contained in Order 39. 192
The U.S. appears to argue that the Resolution's mandate
extends beyond the law of occupation law, and thus, the
laws must be interpreted to allow the CPA to fulfill its
mandate imposed by the Security Council.' 93
The CPA argues that it was given express
permission to reform the institutions of Iraq under
Resolution 1483.194 Proponents of this argument maintain
that Order 39 conceives of the CPA "effecting on Iraqi
politics, law, and institutions an overhaul, the scope of
which will be nothing short of radical."' 95 Even if the U.S.
has increased responsibilities-as opposed to rights-in
Iraq, it should be prohibited from destroying the political,
economic, social, and cultural fabric of the country.
190 President Bush's Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of the
National Endowment for Democracy, PUB. PAPERS (Nov. 6, 2003).
191 Kim R. Holmes, United States Department of State,
Understanding United Nations Resolution 1483,. at
http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/20930.htm.
19 id.
193 id.
194 Id. See generally S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 17.
1" Thomas Grant, Iraq: How to Reconcile Conflicting
Obligations of Occupation and Reform, ASIL INSIGHTS, Jun. 2003,
available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh I 07al.htm.
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2. Response to U.S. Position that Resolution 1483 Permits
Investment Law Reforms in Post Conflict Iraq.
In spite of the U.S. argument, evidence indicates
that Resolution 1483 prohibits the institution of Order 39
and, further, fails to recognize the legitimacy of the U.S.
and U.K. in Iraq.' 96 Resolution 1483 refers to the U.S. and
U.K. as occupying powers and requires them to abide by
the customary international human rights law, the U.N.
Charter, Geneva Conventions, and Hague Regulations.
197
These bodies of law apply to both lawful and unlawful
occupying powers.'98 Resolution 1483 merely recognizes
the status of the U.S. and U.K. as occupying powers in Iraq
and does not, however, address whether the U.S. and U.K.
are lawful or unlawful occupiers.
199
Furthermore, the mandate and legal framework of
Resolution 1483 should be read in plain terms and in light
of the fact that the Security Council has not addressed or
resolved the legality of the original use of force in Iraq and
has nothing to say regarding the legitimacy of the CPA's
overall objectives in Iraq. Resolution 1483 is explicit in its
mandate to the U.S. and U.K. and the designation of
applicable rules of law, which prohibit the U.S. and U.K.
from instituting economic reforms that are not in the best
interests of Iraqis and deny Iraqis the right to make
decisions about their economic, political, and cultural
life.2 00 Accordingly, the U.S. and U.K. are expressly bound
by both humanitarian law and other relevant international
196 See generally John Innes, US and UK Action in Post-War
Iraq May be Illegal, THE SCOTSMAN, May 22, 2003, available at
http://news.scotsman.com/index.cfin?id=576102003.
197 S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 17.
198 Id.
199 HAGUEREGULATIONS, supra note 5, at art. 42.200 S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 17, at IN 2, 4,7 and 8.
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law, which disproves the U.S. assertion that it is free to act
in a manner inconsistent with occupation law to further the
aims of Resolution 1483. The Security Council was clear
in its delineation of the legal framework constraining CPA
activities when referencing the Geneva Convention, Hague
Regulations, and other international law. 20 1 Thus- the CPA
must interpret the permissible activities under Resolution
1483 in a manner consistent with the legal obligations
enabling and limiting their effectuation.
The CPA may point to Paragraph Eight of
Resolution 1483, which addresses institutional change and
economic reconstruction as evidence of its mandate in Iraq
and the permissibility of its investment reforms in Order
39. 202 However, Paragraph Eight, unlike Paragraph Four, is
not directed solely to the CPA as occupying force.20 3
Rather, the provision calls upon the Secretary General to
appoint a U.N. Special Representative to Iraq who would
work "intensively with the Authority, the people of Iraq,
and others concerned to advance efforts to restore and
establish national and local institutions for representative
governance," "facilitate the reconstruction of key
infrastructure," and promote "economic reconstruction and
the conditions for sustainable development, including
through coordination with national and regional
organizations, as appropriate, civil society, donors, and the
international financial institutions. '
2°4
This language outlines the responsibility for
institutional and economic reconstruction with the Special
Representative, who will work with the CPA in these
201 S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 17.
202 Ord. 39, supra note 9; S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 17, at
8.
203 S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 17, at 4 and 8.
2Nid.
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efforts.205  This provision further contemplates the
promotion of economic reconstruction and not necessarily
the abolition of current laws and institutions, which are
expressly prohibited by the bodies of law governing CPA
activities, including the Geneva Conventions, Hague
Regulations, and customary international law.
206
Reconstruction could be advanced through the rebuilding
and development of existing institutions with technical
assistance provided. to the Iraqis for future changes in
economic system. Additionally, Paragraph Eight should be
read in accordance with both the legal mandate established
in the Resolution itself and international law generally, in
light of the ordinary meaning to be given to its express
terms in their context and in light of the object and
purpose. 20 7  Consequently, a fair reading of the text of
Resolution 1483 does not authorize the CPA to install a
neo-liberal market system in Iraq.
Under Resolution 1483, the responsibilities of the
U.S. and U.K. were expanded when compared with the
obligations of occupiers in the absence of such a resolution
under the international law governing occupation.20 8
However, the legal framework established by Resolution
1483 clearly limits the rights of the U.S. as an occupying
force as per the Geneva Conventions, Hague Regulations,
and other relevant international law.
209
20 Id. at 8.206 id.
207 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES art. 31
(1969).
. 208 U.S. Council on Foreign Relations Roundtable Discussion
on UNSC Resolution 1483, May 29, 2003, available at
http://www.cfr.org/pub6058/david_l_phillips/roundtable-on unsc-reso
lution_1483.php.
209 S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 17, at Preamble, 13.
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Only a new Security Council Resolution
specifically authorizing structural economic reforms could
legitimize the actions taken by the CPA.210 This was the
opinion of U.K. Attorney General Lord Goldsmith who, in
a memo to Prime Minister Blair, indicated that many of the
CPA's actions may have been unlawful in the continuing
absence of a new U.N. resolution specifically authorizing
them.211 Lord Goldsmith wrote, "[m]y view is that a
further Security Council resolution is needed to authorize
imposing reform and restructuring of Iraq and its
government." 212 The memo suggests almost everything the
U.S.-led CPA has done, from forming an interim Iraqi
administration to the control of oil and the award of
reconstruction contracts to U.S. firms, may have been
invalid.
B. Impact and Context of Order 39
This section provides the context for the reforms in
Order 39 and presents the economic philosophy
underpinning the reforms. First, this section analyzes the
investment regime created under Order 39 as a domestic
investment model utilizing transnational corporations for
economic growth and documents the manner in which it
purports to attract and regulate investment and benefit the
Iraqis. Second, it critiques the model established by Order
39 in light of the right to self-determination and right to
PSNR and argues that the reforms violate these rights,
noting that the benefits identified by the CPA will not occur
under the reforms. This section then responds to the
benefits identified by the CPA and compares the CPA
model to existing internationally recognized domestic law
models for attracting and retaining FDI in a human rights
210 U.N. CHARTER arts. 39 and 41.
211 Innes, supra note 196.
212 Id.; see also O'Connell, supra note 89.
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oriented and sustainable manner. Finally, it argues that
Order 39 violates the law of occupation and that the U.S.
and U.K. have not met their obligations under the
Resolution 1483.
1. Context and Philosophical Foundations of Order 39
Because the U.S. oversees the CPA and acts as the
primary architect and impetus behind the reforms in Order
39, it will be the primary subject of this analysis. Order 39
is based on an American, neo-liberal world view that hails
economic liberalization as a precondition for freedom and
economic, social, and political development.213 According
to President Bush, governments who do not maximize
private enterprise and the exploitation of natural resources
effectively stifle "freedom," "independent thought and
creativity," and will never have a "strong and successful
society." 214  Speaking of the Middle East as a whole,
President Bush stated, "[w]hole [Middle Eastern] societies
remain stagnant while the world moves ahead. These are
not the failures of a culture or a religion. These are the
failures of political and economic doctrines .... Successful
societies privatize their economies and secure the rights of
property. 2
15
The Order 39-type reforms are part of the U.S.'s
overall foreign policy and strategy for regional reform in
the Middle East. 2 1  The reforms did not originate
213 See Carl J. Schramm, Building Entrepreneurial Economies,
83 FOREIGN AFFAIRs No. 4, (July/August 2004).
214 President George W. Bush, Remarks By The President At
The 20th Anniversary Of The National Endowment For Democracy,
Nov. 6, 2003, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/1 1/20031106-3.html.215 id.
216 See Let's All Go to the Yard Sale: Iraq's Economic
Liberalization, The Economist, Sept. 27, 2003; President George W.
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organically in the context of Iraq but are part of the U.S.'s
overall national security strategy as documented in the
National Security Strategy of The United States, a 2002
Presidential document detailing the U.S.'s global security
strategy.217 According to the document, the U.S. national
security strategy is based on spreading a "distinctly
American internationalism that reflects the union of our
values and our national interests." 21 8 To protect its interests
globally, the U.S. implements policies that strengthen
market incentives and market institutions, because it has an
incentive to expand markets for its top businesses and
secure solid deals for its top industries, such as the oil
industry.219 An important example of this policy is the U.S.
support for bilateral and multilateral investment and free
trade agreements, such as the Central American Free Trade
Agreement, that include business friendly policies that
further the ability of U.S. business to sell their goods and
operate abroad.220
Bush, Fact Sheet: Proposed Middle East Initiatives, May 9, 2003,
available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030509-12.htmi;
President George W. Bush, US-Middle East Free Trade Area, June 9,
2004, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040609-37.html.
See also Becky Branford, US Legal Legacy for Iraqi Economy, (April
7, 2005) available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/4417759.stm. This source
includes a lively debate between two economists on whether this policy
has been beneficial for Iraq.
217 National Security Council, National Security Strategy of
the United States ofAmerica, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
218 id.
"
219 1 d
220 See, e.g., Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State,
CAFTA is a win win, available at
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rem/46638.htm; President Signs Central
Crumn
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The Bush Administration characterized the U.S.
"goal" in Iraq as "help[ing] the Iraqi people build a stable,
just and prosperous country that poses no threat to America
or the world.",221 According to the U.S., free trade and free
markets are beneficial and "relevant for all economies-
industrialized countries, emerging markets, and the
developing world. 222 Conveniently, it also expands U.S.
markets and economic and political influence worldwide.
According to President Bush, "[tihe establishment of a free
Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed
event in the global democratic revolution." 223  The U.S.
views Iraq as a strategic actor in the region and designed
Order 39 for regional impact that will advance the its
economic and political agenda by, for example, providing a
system that furthers the establishment of U.S. and other
Western multinationals in Iraq.
Both the U.S. and U.K. believe that market reform,
including privatization and democracy in Iraq, will spread
across the region as a whole, and there is no indication that
the Iraqi oil industry would be immune to such reforms.
224
Investors openly predict that once privatization of Iraq
takes root, Iran will be forced to privatize its oil to
compete.225 Furthermore, Oil company executives publicly
American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR),
August 2, 2005, available at
http//www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2005/50492.htm; See National
Security Council, supra note 217 at 17-20..
221 George W. Bush, U.S. President, Radio Address, PUB.
PAPERS (Oct. 11, 2003) (emphasis added).
222 See National Security Council, supra note 217, at 17-20.
2 President Bush Discusses Freedom, supra note 214.
2 Bush, Blair Discuss Sharon Plan; Future of Iraq in Press
Conference, April 16, 2004, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040416-4.html
225 S. Rob Sobhani, Ordinary Iranians Applaud Bush's 'Axis
of Evil' Talk, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2002.
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acknowledge their interest in Iraq's oil fields.226 This
interest is reflected in the U.S. Presidential Middle East
Partnership Initiative (MEPI), which encourages
liberalization and privatization in the Middle East.22
7
According to President Bush, the MEPI strives to link the
Arab world, the U.S., global private sector businesses, non-
governmental organizations, civil society elements, and
governments together to develop innovative policies and
programs that support reform in the region.228 This
initiative is evidence that the economic policies instituted in
Iraq through Order 39 are part of a wider U.S. foreign
policy initiative in the Middle East and not part of a
reformation and reconstruction process that sets up the
Iraqis for an independent future. But, it must be reiterated
that the Bush Administration seeks to link economies in the
Middle East to promote U.S.-led reform in violation of the
Iraqis' right to self-determination and PSNR and the
activities permitted by occupiers under the Geneva
Convention and Hague Regulations.
2. Model Established by Order 39
Order 39 establishes an open door domestic
investment framework for Iraq to attract and retain
privately owned foreign business and capital. 229  This
framework utilizes MNEs as tools for economic and social
development and liberal regulations to attract investors.230
Order 39 is based on the classical economic theory of
foreign investment, which suggests that foreign capital
226 Dan Morgan and David Ottaway, In Iraqi War Scenario,
Oil is Key Issue as American Drillers Eye Huge Petroluem Pool,
WASHINGTON POST, September 15, 2002.
227 Middle East Partnership Initiative, United States
Department of State, available at http://mepi.state.gov/mepi/.
g id.
229 Ord. 39, supra note 9, at § 2.230 id.
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brought into the host state aids development by providing
increased domestic capital available for public benefit.
2 3
The theory maintains that the foreign investor brings in
technology and knowledge not available in the host state
that leads to diffusion of technology within the host
economy.2 32  Furthermore, the theory conceives that the
implemented reforms will allow for new employment
opportunities and better-trained employees possessing
managerial and technical skills.233  Thus, in theory,
incoming companies will build infrastructure, health, and
education facilities to benefit the foreign investor, which
will, in turn, benefit the society as a whole.
234
The United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development recognizes the contribution of FDI to
economic growth in developing countries and shows that
"FDI inflows are heavily concentrated in a few host
developing countries.235 The U.S. contends that Iraq must
attract FDI in order to bring money into the economy to aid
Iraqi development efforts.216 The idea is that the more the
laws provide flexibility and freedom to companies, the
more opportunity for foreign investment in Iraq. Some
proponents of this model argue that American MNEs
operating abroad export democratic values and human
rights. 23  According to this argument, when Western
MNEs invest abroad, they send personnel into the host state
who interact with local inhabitants and communities and
231 SORNARAJAH, supra note 65, at 38-42.232 Id.
233 id.
234 Id.
235 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
supra note 55, at 13.
236 President Bush's Radio Address, supra note 221.
237 Debora Spar, The Spotlight and the Bottom Line: How
Multinationals Export Human Rights, 77 FOREIGN AFFAIRS No. 2
(March/April 1998).
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spread information and democratic values generally, while
exposing local populations to new products, ideas, and
possibilities.238  Thus, according to this rationale, the
regime established by Order 39 would permit a current of
Western culture and values to flow into Iraq.
C. Response to the Bush Administration Model for FDI
Under Order 39
While FDI through MNEs can potentially assist the
economic development of Iraq, the positive effects of FDI
are not automatic, but determined by the conditions
prevailing in the host countries, the investment strategies of
investors, and host state policies.239 Without restrictions
and supervision, FDI will be unsustainable and will yield
detrimental results, especially in fragile economies with
weak institutions such as the one found in Iaq.240 To be
sustainable, FDI laws should be narrowly tailored to the
specific context and needs of the host state.24' Therefore,
for states seeking to attract investment primarily from
MNEs, the FDI process should be tailored "to target
investors, guide their resource allocation and induce them
to undertake more complex value-added activities than they
would perhaps otherwise have done."
242
Resolution 1483 requires the U.S. and U.K. to abide
by their obligations under the U.N. Charter and other
relevant international law.243  World Trade Organization
28 id.
239 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
supra note 55.
240 Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra
note 16, at 7.241 id.
242 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
supra note 55, at 50.
243 See S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 17, at Preamble.
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member states have undertaken to respect, protect, and
fulfill human rights in all contexts and have committed to
international cooperation and assistance to promote human
rights and create a social and international order through
which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be
fully realized. 244  These obligations apply to investment
liberalization exercises undertaken by members, whether
national or international in scope, and require that
liberalization and privatization not compromise state action
and policy to promote and protect human rights.
245
Furthermore, states should formulate national investment
policies that improve the well-being of their entire
population on the basis of their active participation in
development and the fair distribution of resulting
benefits.246 In the context of occupation generally and the
US mandate in Iraq in particular, these rules are essential to
establish a regime that promotes "the welfare of the Iraqi
people through the effective administration of the territory,
including in particular working towards the restoration of
conditions of security and stability and the creation of
conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine
their own political future.
Unfortunately, as will be explored in the next
section, the investment model propagated by Order 39
undermines the potential benefits FDI can bring to Iraq and
violates the Iraqis' right to self-determination and PSNR.
First, the influx of powerful, Western MNEs into Iraq, in
the wake of weak governmental institutions and
commercial infrastructure, crowds out indigenous
enterprises and makes Iraq economically and socially
24 Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra
note 16, at 2.
245 Id.
2461d. at 18.
247 S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 17, at 4.
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dependent on the presence of foreign companies. Second,
the reforms are not human rights or development oriented,
but designed and implemented by an undemocratic regime,
the CPA. Utilization of such reforms will cause the new
Iraqi government to be unable to undo the CPA's effects
and effectuate the will of the Iraqi people. Third, the
reforms were implemented in a corrupt fashion, which
allowed investors to participate in the formation of the
policies themselves. Fourth, the reforms fail to consider
the cultural heritage in the context of Iraq248 and impose a
neo-liberal economic system that will potentially benefit
the U.S. to the detriment of the Iraqi people. Finally, Order
39 fails to recognize the inalienable right of Iraq to freely
dispose of its natural wealth and resources in accordance
with its national interests.
1. Requirements for a Domestic FDI Regime that Supports
the Right to Self-Determination and Right to PSNR
According to the U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights, state policies regarding the admission,
entry, and establishment of FDI have extreme human rights
impacts.249 States have a duty to regulate investment to
protect and promote human rights generally and must take
action in four key areas.250 First, states must regulate forms
of investment that can have negative economic effects on
performance and reduce state resources.251 Second, states
must have the flexibility to use performance requirements
and other measures. 252 If they are prohibited, as is the case
with Order 39, states must still be able to use local content
2" Rojas, supra note 164, at 150.
749 Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra
note 16, at 19.230 See generally id.
251 d
232 Id.
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and other requirements to promote the human rights of
certain individuals or groups. Third, states must have the
ability to withdraw commitment to liberalize when
liberalization has negative impacts on human rights.253
Fourth, states must have the ability to introduce new
regulations to promote and protect human rights.254 FDI
must be sustainable and directed to the needs of those
living in the host state.
255
The strategy toward FDI selected by a government
reflects the economic position, beliefs, and capabilities of
the government's concerns. 256  The United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) cites
four main approaches to FDI taken by governments in the
world, ranging from the most liberal, passive, open-door
approach, with little to no restrictions on foreign investors,
to the most protectionist model with heavy restrictions on
FDI and the implementation of policies to strengthen only
the indigenous manufacturing sector.257 Order 39 adopts
one of the most liberal investment models conceivable,
which should be reserved for strong, stable economies with
complex and established government and commercial
infrastructure. 25 The legal infrastructure in Iraq suffers
from "being in a time warp" as Iraq has been "shielded and
excluded from the process of commercial development."
259
Consequently, Iraq is not prepared for the regime imposed
by Order 39.
253 d
2 id.
255 Report of the High commissioner for Human rights, supra
note 16.
2 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
supra note 55.
27 Id.
25s Id.
259 Philip Hoult, From War to Law, LAW SOCiETY GAZETrE,
Oct. 2, 2003, at 22.
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According to UNCTAD, the "best practice" in FDI
management for sustainable development in developing
host countries is the model adopted by Singapore, which
requires "pervasive and selective guidance and inducement
of foreign investors" to upgrade their contributions to the
development of the host state, as opposed to a more liberal
open market model that is less, if at all, selective.260 The
best approach combats the negative effects of FDI on a host
state by restricting FDI and guiding MNE activities to
maximize their contribution to the host through
"operational measures such as performance
requirements. 26' Order 39 does not limit the amount of
foreign participation in Iraq and does not implement
performance requirements.262 Gradually, developing host
countries may be moving away from the passive open-door
model and moving toward the more sustainable domestic
investment models containing more restrictive regulations
on investors so as to ensure capital flows benefit the
economy, development, and local communities. 263 In fact,
even countries with a more open approach on the books do
not, in practice, allow investors the type of complete access
permitted by Order 39.264
According to prevailing international standards, a
domestic model for sustainable development in Iraq would
include seven characteristics that are lacking in Order 39.265
260 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
supra note 55, at 55.
261 id.
262 CPA, supra note 29, at § 4(2).
2 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
supra note 55.
2" United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
Admission and Establishment, at 11, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/1 0 (vol. II)
(1999) at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiitl0v2_en.pdf.
20 See generally Transcript of Meeting, summarized in Report
of the Expert Meeting on Existing Regional and Multilateral Investment
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First, liberalization must occur gradually and incrementally
in the context of clear and transparent government
institutions capable of supporting and regulating
investors.2 66 Second, domestic industries must be protected
by restricting some sectors from investment or limiting the
forms of investment.267  Third, modem production and
management technologies must be transferred to local
workers and business. 6 8 Fourth, local workers must be
hired and trained to do all levels of work in the
corporations.269  Fifth, corporations must be required to
provide adequate compensation and health care and other
benefits to its employees.270 Sixth, corporations must be
required to reinvest a reasonable percentage of profits back
into the local economy and business before repatriation.27
1
Seventh, investors must be required, when possible, to use
local materials and undertake joint ventures with local
enterprises while host states screen investors upon entry to
ensure they will contribute to the development of the
state.272
Implementation of such measures better enables the
host state to preserve national economic policy goals,
health and safety standards, and public morals.27 3 These
controls are essential for the exercise of self-
determination, 274 because states have a sovereign right
Agreements and their Development Dimensions, TD/B/COM.2/11 &
TD/B/COM.2/EM.3/3 (1998).
267 Id,
268 Id.
269 id
270 id.
271 Transcript, supra note 265.
272 Id.
273 PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND
THE LAW 184-194. (1999).
274 See United Nations Conference on Trade and
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under customary international law to regulate the entry of
foreign investors into the state and need a wide margin of
discretion to determine the terms on which they admit
investment. 2
75
According to this rationale, host states should enact
laws that place requirements on corporations not directly
relating to the commercial motive of the enterprise, such as
requirements that they build infrastructure or hire local
employees.276 Without regulation, the use of corporations
for FDI may increase economic dependence. 7  Such
performance requirements serve as a way for developing
countries to achieve development goals through technology
transfer and to develop supplier industries as links to the
domestic sector.278 Performance requirements serve as an
important way for host states to regulate investor impacts279
on the domestic economy and society. Yet, Order 39280
prohibits performance requirements. Order 39's national
treatment and related provisions implicitly prohibit every
element described above in the list of attributes of
sustainable development for developing host states,
reinforcing the argument that the provisions were not
designed for Iraq to meet the needs of the Iraqis.
28 1
Development, supra note 264, at 11.
275 Id. at 12.
276 See United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, supra note 264.
277 World Bank, Private Capital Flows Return to a Few
Developing Countries as Aid Flows to the Poorest Rise Only Slightly,
News Release No. 2004/284/S. (April 19, 2004).
278 See generally ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL
PPvATE INvEsTMENT (1982).
279 id
2w0Ord. 39, supra note 9, at §§ 4, 13, 14.
21 id
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MNEs are not altruistic entities seeking to aid the
peoples inhabiting the states in which they invest. Host
state objectives in attracting investment are different than
those of entering investors. Firms invest abroad because of
ownership advantages and the potential enhancement of
their competitiveness and market share in an international
context.28; Large, manager-controlled corporations are a
major source of market distortion and failure. 28 3 Through
their size and technological capacity, they can monopolize
and distort product markets, undermine consumer choice
through advertising, avoid market regulation, and avoid
making losses that smaller, often domestic, firms cannot
avoid.28 4  This reality must be acknowledged and
controlled.28 5 Thus, in the context of a fragile occupied
host state, the strategy of attracting large multinationals to
serve as the major development force may fail to aid the
host state's quest for independence, economic stability, and
sustainable development.
2. Specific Examples of Problems Emanating from Order
39
It has been asserted that Order 39 will aid Iraq by
creating jobs and capital, transferring technology and skills
to the local businesses and employees, and increasing the
competitiveness of the economy.2 6 The actual impact of
Order 39 on each of these issues will be addressed in turn.
282 See generally United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, supra note 55.283 MUCHLINSKI, supra note 273, at 94.
284 id.
285 Id.
216 Ord. 39, supra note 9, at % 4 and 5.
Post-Conflict Iraq
a. Employment
In terms of employment, the CPA argues that Order
39 will enhance employment in the host state by creating
new jobs in Iraq.28 7 However, since the institution of Order
39, the CPA has laid off thousands of workers in the
process of privatizing formerly state-owned enterprises. 28 8
Workers lost not only their jobs, but their pensions and
benefits as well, leaving countless families vulnerable and
without the means for family support.289  Furthermore,
Order 39's national treatment and related provisions
prohibit any domestic law requiring foreign investors to
hire Iraqis, as these provisions prohibit Iraqi domestic law
from regulating the operations of foreign investors.
290
When new foreign investor companies enter the host state,
further loss of employment sometimes results due to the
corresponding job losses in the Iraqi firms that are unable
to compete with the large Western MNEs.
29 1
The stability of new jobs created by foreign
investment is questionable because investors' commitments
to remaining in Iraq are not known and not necessarily long
term. Also, investor security is low, and the future
enforceability of the CPA contracts is uncertain.2 92 Finally,
even if the corporations remain, local personnel seldom end
up in high management positions where confidences are
127 Id. at 5.
2" Naomi Klein, How to End the War, In These Times, May 5,
2005.
289 James Thuo Gathii, Foreign and Other Economic Rights
Upon Conquest and Under Occupation: Iraq in Comparative and
Historical Context, 25 U. PA. J. INT4L ECON. L. 491, 546 (2004).
2w Ord. 39, supra note 9, at §§ 4, 13, 14.
291 MucHLINsKI, supra note 273, at 91.
292 Thomas Catan, Iraq Business Deals May Be Invalid, Law
Experts Warn, FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 2003, at 14.
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shared.293 Thus, it does not appear that these provisions of
Order 39 make sense in the context of post-war Iraq,
especially when the provisions are assessed in light of their
mandate and purpose, which is to provide a better life for
Iraqis and assist in the development and reconstruction
effort.
The text of Order 39 asserts that "that facilitating
foreign investment will help to develop infrastructure,
foster the growth of Iraqi business, create jobs, raise
capital, result in the introduction of new technology into
Iraq and promote the transfer of knowledge and skills to
Iraqis." 294 If, as discussed above, it is commonly
understood that the U.S. implemented such provisions even
though they undermine or simply do not further the goal of
sustainable development and reconstruction, the U.S. is
acting ultra vires in Iraq and in violation of the authority
granted in Resolution 1483.
b. Inflow of Capital and Balance of Payments
As for the inflow of capital and balance of
payments, the CPA asserts that the inflow of foreign
investment into Iraq will assist Iraq's overall economy in
transitioning from recovery to sustainable growth.295 While
a host state's balance of payments may be improved by the
initial investment, this initial benefit must be weighed
against several contrary factors. Though money may
initially enter the economy when the investment is initiated,
the longer-term outflow of capital through loan repayments
and dividend remittances creates a net loss of money in the
293 SORNARAJAH, supra note 65, at 40.
294 Ord. 39, supra note 9, at Preamble 5.
29, GATHI1, supra note 289, at 540.
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national economy. 296 Thus, the net effect of the operations
of foreign investors in Iraq could be a loss of capital.
Furthermore, if the investor is a large and highly
integrated MNE that is obliged to purchase supplies from
affiliates in other states for an amount that exceeds the
initial inflow of capital, the Iraqi economy could be
adversely affected, because foreign investors operating
within the country are using revenues generated by or'
associated with the operations in Iraq to purchase supplies
from other countries. 297  When this occurs, domestic
sources of such supplies do not receive the benefit of
selling to the foreign investors operating in the host state,
and revenues that could be pumped into the host economy
are spent elsewhere.
Furthermore, while infrastructure is often built by
vNEs, it is usually built for the enjoyment of home state
employees and is rarely enjoyed by the local population.298
Therefore, only the elite would be able to afford to live
according to the standards of foreigners and afford to pay to
enjoy the healthcare and education facilities enjoyed by the
foreign nationals working for the INE.299 Thus, it appears
that such provisions will not create opportunities, fight
unemployment, and improve living conditions in Iraq. The
regime does not enable Iraqi industry to grow in connection
with the increased investment that occurs when foreign
investors are required to negotiate with Iraqi companies
first for supplies and related goods, while also creating
jobs, skills, and technology transfer.
2 MUCHLINSKI, supra note 273, at 91.2 97 Id. at 92.
2" See SORNARAiAH, supra note 65, at 40.
2 Id.
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c. Technology and Skills Transfer
In terms of technology and skill transfer, the U.S.
argues that because MNEs are the principal holders of
advanced productive technology and managerial skills, they
will be able to enhance the host economy "through the
transfer and dissemination of competitive benefits."
300
However, this argument fails to account for the typical
resistance MNEs have to sharing their most sophisticated
technology. 301  The more unique and valuable the
information, the less likely the MNE is willing to share
it.3°2  Typically, MNEs use lower level technology in
developing states that is outdated or capital-intensive and
unsuitable for labor-intensive production in developing
countries.303  MNEs often invest in developing states
because newer goods requiring newer technology have
replaced the product cycle for the goods it manufactured in
the home state.304 The older products are then moved to a
developing market that has yet to receive such a product.
30 5
Thus, state of the art technology is generally not
transferred. 30
6
Furthermore, MNEs limit technology transfer by
setting up wholly-owned subsidiaries in the host state to
control the use of technology and skills, or by entering into
licensing agreements that restrict the dissemination of
valuable information.30 7  Therefore, specific rules as to
joint venture requirements or technology transfer
31 MUCHLINSKI, supra note 273, at 92.
301 id.
302 U.N. Eminent Person's Report on the Role of MNCs on
Development and International Relations, 13 ILM 800, 844 (1974).
303 SORNARAJAH, supra note 65, at 39.
314 Id. at 39-40.
305 Id
306 Id.
31 MUCHLINSKI, supra note 273, at 92.
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requirements must be implemented in the host state to
protect against these tactics and the natural conflict of
interest between the MNE that owns specific valuable
technology and the host state that seeks technology
transfer.
Provisions requiring foreign investors to operate
through joint ventures make it more difficult for them to
keep their technology secret.3 °0 However, Order 39
specifically prohibits rules that require investors to operate
through joint ventures.30 9 Therefore, it appears that if the
CPA was interested in promoting technology transfer to
provide knowledge, skills, training, and opportunities to
Iraqis, it would have structured these provisions as noted
above.
d Increased Competition
Finally, regarding competition, the U.S. argues that
the presence of Western MNEs in Iraq will "spur domestic
firms into greater efficiency by exposing them to new
competition."3 10  However, without rules that facilitate
spillover effects that make new technology available to
local firms and without adequate investment capital for
local firms to develop and compete, foreign firms will drive
domestic competition out of business, thus eradicating
indigenous business and leaving the provision of goods and
services up to foreign MNEs.3 1  It is likely that anti-
competitive effects will result from this arrangement,
especially in Iraq where there are few if any indigenous
businesses operating in competition with increasing
presence of foreign MNEs.
308 SORNARAJAH, supra note 65, at 37.
309 Ord. 39, supra note 9, at §§ 4 and 7.310 MuCHLINSKI, supra note 273, at 92.
311 Id.
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Furthermore, in light of the lack of government
infrastructure and stagnant business practices due to
sanctions, the effect of powerful MNEs entering Iraq will
be that indigenous companies will be unable to emerge as
viable businesses because they will not possess a sufficient
opportunity to grow and stabilize in order to compete with
the powerful MNEs. However, Order 39 prohibits the
provision of special government assistance to Iraqi
businesses. 312  Therefore, in order for an Iraqi business
culture to grow organically and be sustainable, a more
transparent and level playing field must be created.
3. Lack of Competition and Transparency in
Implementation of Order 39
While the reforms in Order 39 emphasize
competition and free markets, the process used to attract
FDI in Iraq was not based on such principles. Before the
war began, the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) secretly asked six U.S. companies to submit bids
for a $900 million government contract to reconstruct
various Iraqi infrastructures, including the reconstruction of
Iraqi oil fields.313 When considering the project, USAID
only contacted U.S. companies and failed to even consider
firms from other countries, including Iraq.
314
The selected firms, like Halliburton, which were
awarded an USAID contract to rebuild Iraqi oil fields, have
been accused of participating in the decision-making
processes for reconstruction regulation even before the
312 Ord. 39, supra note 9, at §§ 4, 13, 14.
313 See Danny Penman, US Firms Set for Post War Iraq,
GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (London), March 11, 2003, available at
http://guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,,911941,00.html.314 id.
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occupation.31 5 USAID explained that they limited the
selection to six U.S. companies because it was necessary
for "security" and because U.S. taxpayers were funding the
reconstruction.316 However, foreign companies were made
eligible and have been included in the subcontracting
work.
317
The competition for these contracts was particularly
fierce, as firms stood to gain not only from the immediate
contract but also from the inside track to post-war Iraqi
business opportunities long-term, especially oil industry
contracts. The notion that these firms would have an
inside track on Iraqi business opportunities and be
sufficiently established in Iraq in the long-term suggests
that the U.S. and U.K. project in Iraq was designed to
outlive the occupation, which would compromise the
Iraqi's right to self-determination. This suggestion is
supported by President Bush's quest to "link" U.S. and
Middle Eastern economies and business sectors.
319
Although Order 39 prohibits investment in the oil
industry, the U.S. has taken steps to situate U.S. oil
company involvement in Iraqi oil long-term. 320  Shortly
before the war, President Bush and Vice-President Cheney
created and chaired the National Energy Policy
3 16 1d
"
317 Sen. Joseph Lieberman, Lieberman Seeks More Answers
on USAID Bidding Process for Post-War Construction Contracts,
Senate Committee on Government Affairs, (April 16, 2003), available
at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/index.cfin?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&
Affiliation=R&PressRelease id=253&Month=4&Year=2003.318 id.
319 United States Department of State, Middle East
Partnership Initiative, available at http://mepi.state.gov/mepi/.320 See Morgan & Ottaway, supra note 226.
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Development Group, a government organization that
studied the challenge posed to the U.S. by non-U.S. oil
companies. 321 The group produced a summary of its
findings, including a map of Iraq identifying its major oil
fields and corresponding "Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield
Contracts." 322 U.S. companies were not included on the
list, and the group concluded that this absence could
"undermine our [U.S.] economy, our standard of living, our
national economy. ' 323  These documents were only
released by a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court.324 Since
1995, U.S. petroleum giants have admitted that "Iraq is the
biggie" in terms of future oil production, that the U.S. oil
companies are "worried about being left out" of Iraq's oil
dealings due to the antagonism between Washington and
Baghdad, and that they fear that "the companies that win
the rights to develop Iraqi fields could be on the road to
becoming the most powerful multinationals of the next
century. ' ,2
321 See Cheney v. -United States Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 367
(2004).
322 See Maps and Charts of Iraqi Oilfields: Cheney Energy
Task Force (July 17, 2003), available at
www.judicialwatch.org/071703.c .shtml.
323 Reliable, Affordable and Environmentally Sound Energy
for America's Future, Report of the National Energy Policy
Development Group, May 16, 2001, available at
http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/press/2001/nep/nep.html;
Documents regarding Vice-President Cheney's panel are available at
http://www.judicialwatch.org/.
324 Larry Everest, Cheney, Energy and Iraq Invasion Supreme
Court to Rule on Secrecy, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., March 21, 2004, at
E- 1, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/03/2 1IINGOH5LTDA1 .DT
L. 325 id
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Since the end of the war, the U.S. has engaged in
negotiations with the companies holding pre-war contracts
for Iraqi oil and is negotiating the division of Iraqi oil fields
with them.326  Furthermore, President Bush has signed
Executive Order 13303, giving immunity to oil companies
for all activities and agreements relating to Iraqi oil.
327
The participation of U.S. firms in the reconstruction
and development of Iraqi oil fields has had significant
implications for the Iraqis' ability to control the disposition
of their assets after the transfer of sovereignty. Meanwhile,
Iraqi companies have been excluded from the decision-
making process and will be unable to decide what happens
to their national wealth and resources long-term, which is a
fundamental human right and essential element of any
stable, independent, and successful Iraqi democratic state.
The compromise of this right may undermine any future
change for a democratic Iraq, as established corporate and
foreign interests in the country may create an entrenched
shadow power structure.
D. Application of the Law of Occupation
As discussed in the Part I of this article, an
occupying power has an obligation to the inhabitants of the
territory it occupies primarily to act as usufruct over the
national assets and resources of the territory and to respect
the interests of the population. 328  An occupying power
should not use its authority to exploit the population or
local resources for the benefit of its own population and
territory and, likewise, should not alter the laws in force in
the territory unless it is absolutely prevented from
326 Ed Vulliamy et al., Scramble to Carve up Iraqi Oil
Reserves Lies Behind US Diplomacy, THE OBSERVER, Oct. 6, 2002.
327 id.328 See supra part 1.
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upholding them.329 Furthermore, private property should
be respected in the territory, which includes proprietary
rights granted in state contracts. 330  Absent specific
authorization in the existing law of the occupied territory or
military necessity, occupying powers are prohibited from
nullifying or suspending legitimate state contracts with
foreign parties by amending the law of the occupied
territory by legislative or other means.3 3 ' Occupants may
let or utilize public land and buildings but cannot make a
contract or lease extending beyond the conclusion of the
war. 332
Keeping the above in mind, Order 39 violates the
law of occupation because it (1) altered existing Iraqi law
when not required by military necessity;333 (2) confiscated
the private property of Iraqi citizens when it terminated
state employees during privatization and denied them
benefits packages and pensions to which employees were
entitled;314 (3) terminated the existing contracts between
non-U.S. oil companies and the state of Iraq;335 (4) imposed
an economic regime that worked to the detriment of the
local population and to the benefit of the occupying force,
in violation of existing Iraqi law;336 (5) imposed contracts
with foreign investors for 40-year lease terms, which
329 Human Rights Watch, supra note 106; HAGUE
REGULATIONS supra note 5, at art. 43.
330 Bekker, supra note 114; Paust, supra note 114.
331 id.
332 Army Field Manual, supra note 121.
333 Gathii, supra note 289.
334 id.
335 id.
336 id.
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extend beyond the duration of the occupation;33 7 (6) failed
to act as usufruct over Iraqi assets.
338
The obligation for an occupying force to act as
usufruct is especially important in the context of Order 39
and post-war Iraq. To act as usufruct means to act in the
best interest of the Iraqis as guardian and protector of their
assets while also acting in a manner that does not devalue
their assets. 339 However, Order 39 reforms do not benefit
the Iraqis and are not in their best interest because through
Order 39, the U.S. and the U.K. have completely
overhauled the Iraqi political and economic system and
restructured Iraqi society on many levels. These changes
have created a foreseeable power structure in Iraq where
Western MNEs can possess significant decision-making
power or, at a minimum, persuasive authority, depriving
Iraqis of their right to self-determination and PSNR.
As discussed above, the decisions of large MNEs
can have serious economic impacts on fragile economies.
340
This impact would likely be amplified in Iraq as Iraq
transitions from a centrally-planned economy to one rich
with foreign investment. Iraqi economic interests could not
have been considered because Order 39 grants 40-year
renewable leases to foreign investors, which means that
Western, CPA-backed investors will be present long after
the June 28, 2004, "handover of sovereignty." This is a
legally incorrect characterization because, under the law of
337 Ord. 39, supra note 9, at § 8.
338 Dobie Langenkamp & Rex. J. Zedalis, What Happens to
the Iraqi Oil: Thoughts.on Some Significant, Unexamined International
Legal Questions Regarding Occupation of Oil Fields, 14 EURJLL 417
(2004).
339 Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.webster-
dictionary.org/defmition/Usufruct (last visited Mar. 27, 2006).
U.N. Eminent Person's Report on the Role of MNCs on
Development and International Relations, 13 ILM 800, 844 (1974).
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occupation, Iraq never lost its legal sovereignty. 34 1 As
suggested, the presence of these foreign investors and their
corresponding influence on the Iraqi economy may make it
difficult for a true democracy to develop as the country
becomes increasingly dependent on the cooperation and
revenues of foreign MNEs.
Furthermore, the privatization measures, which
resulted in the termination of thousands of employees and
the corresponding denial of their pensions and benefits,
closely mirrors an unlawful taking of private property
under the Hague Regulations. 342 The Hague Regulations
and Geneva Convention are clear that an occupying power
may not take action in violation of the law of the occupied
territory unless required by military necessity.
343
Finally, the involvement of U.S. companies in the
reconstruction of Iraqi oil is not only an issue of human
rights law but also of humanitarian law because, by
contract, the oil fields in question previously belonged to
various foreign oil companies. 344 The U.S. has purportedly
cancelled these non-U.S. contracts in violation of the
Hague Regulations, under which the private property of
foreign non-belligerents may not be confiscated under any
circumstances. 345 Accordingly, the U.S. and U.K. should
be made to pay compensation for such violations, a duty in
which both countries have failed to partake.34 6 It is unclear
341 Press Briefing on Iraq Transition, Office of the Press
Secretary, June 28, 2004, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040628.html.
342 Gathii, supra note 289.
343 HAGUE REGULATIONS, supra note 5, at arts. 43, 48-9, 53
and 55.
34 See Jeffrey D. Sachs, American intentions are tainted by
Iraq's oil, Financial Times, May 22, 2003.
345 See generally HAGUE REGULATIONS supra note 5.
346 O'Connell, supra note 89.
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why the U.S. cancelled these contracts rather than allow
Iraq to generate desperately needed revenues from the
operation of these companies and why the U.S. has not paid
compensation to the owners of this property. One may
speculate that the U.S. has always wanted to exclude these
companies in order to provide an inside track into the Iraqi
oil business for both U.S. and U.K. companies.
CONCLUSION
The CPA was formed by the action of both the U.S.
and U.K., without Security Council authorization or U.N.
involvement promised at the start of the war.347 The CPA,
as a self-governing body led by the U.S., is immune from
the Iraqi legal and judicial process.348 The self-proclaimed
mandate of the CPA, found in Regulation One, states that
the CPA is to "create conditions where the Iraqis can freely
determine their own political future" and facilitate the
"sustainable reconstruction and development of Iraq."349 In
the context of Iraq, the U.S. has emphasized accountability,
democracy, and transparency in government. 350  If
accountability is a major goal, then why has the Bush
Administration shielded itself from accountability through
the passage of Executive Orders granting immunity to
37 See supra section I.A. of this article.
348 CPA Public Notice Regarding the Status of Coalition,
Foreign Liaison and Contractor Personnel, 26 June 2003, available at
http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/regulations/20030626_20030626_CPANOTICEForeignMis
sionCir.html.pdf.
349 CPA, supra note 29.
350 President Bush's Remarks at a Reception for Heads of
United Nations General Assembly Delegations in New York City, PUB
PAPERS (Sept. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/print/20020912-
1.html.
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Coalition forces and their agents in Iraq and the U.S., as
well as to U.S. oil companies acting in Iraq?
351
Additionally, as this article discusses, the CPA
lacks the authority to implement the Order 39 reforms
under either the international law of belligerent occupation
or Resolution 1483. This resolution does not give the CPA
explicit authorization to initiate institutional economic
reforms in Iraq. Rather, the U.N. is given the responsibility
to engage in economic reconstruction, and the it may "work
with" the CPA in these efforts.352  All of the duties
prescribed by Resolution 1483 must be understood within
the legal system in which they were given. Thus, the
mandate cannot be understood in a manner that violates the
Hague Regulations, Geneva Conventions, the U.N. Charter,
or the rights to self-determination and PSNR.
Furthermore, Order 39 fails to take a human rights
approach to liberalization and privatization in Iraq, as
required by the U.N. Charter,3 3 thus undermining the
ability of the Iraqis to utilize their wealth and resources in a
manner beneficial to their development and national
objectives. Although the U.S. argues that Order 39 benefits
the human rights of the Iraqis indirectly, 354 as the nation as
a whole improves and a democratic culture emerges, this
approach will not meet the U.S. and U.K. obligations under
the U.N. Charter, which can be interpreted to require the
promotion of human rights and development to be
recognized as the purpose of attracting FDI.3 5
351 Exec. Order No. 13,303, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,931 (May
22,2003).
352 S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 17.
3 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 8 1.
35 See Juhasz, supra note 6.
355 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 81.
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When improperly utilized, privatization can create
severe income and class disparities, "brain-drain" from the
public sector to the private sector, under-funding of the
public sector, overemphasis on commercial objectives at
the expense of social objectives, and "a large and powerful
private sector that can threaten" the ability of the
government to promote human rights.356 In Iraq, the
privatization of public services, or aspects thereof such as
oil, water, and sanitation, threatens Iraqis' access to basic
services and the advancement of the Iraqis' well-being,
especially because the private sector participation in
essential services revolves solely around commercial
concerns and not social, political, cultural, and
environmental concerns. 357  As such, Iraqis will be unable
to determine their political, economic, and social future
because the reforms implement a system that ensures the
primacy of foreign investors in the political and economic
spheres and undermines Iraqi autonomy and development.
Additionally, as a result of the reforms, Iraqis will be
denied the ability to freely dispose of their national wealth,
resources, and assets in the manner they see best fit to aid
their development.
The human rights approach to investment, as
articulated by the U.N., requires the implementation of
complementary measures to ensure the balance of rights
and obligations.358 The promotion and protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms must be an express
objective of domestic investment policy, as required by the
U.N. Charter,359 Resolution 1483, 360 and customary
356 See United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, supra note 55, at 24.
"37 Id. at 28.
358 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 81.
359 id
360 S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 17.
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international law.361 This obligation, in conjunction with
the duty to respect and protect the institutions and
population of the occupied territory under the Hague
Regulations 362 and Geneva Convention,363 demonstrates
the duty of the occupying force to act in the best interest of
the occupied population.
However, Resolution 1483's recognition of the
complementary and mutually reinforcing nature of
international human rights law and the law of occupation
and use of force is in line with international developments
over the last half-century. Statements by U.S. and U.K.
representatives seem to demonstrate an understanding that
international human rights apply in Iraq. For example,
according to the U.K. mission to the U.N., "[a] vital part of
guaranteeing that the future political, legal, and social
structures of Iraq work for the benefit of all Iraqis is to
ensure that human rights and the rule of law are central."36'
Furthermore, President Bush has repeatedly cited
eradicating the human rights abuses of Saddam Hussein as
an essential part of the war against Iraq and maintained that
the U.S. would rid Iraq of such abuses.365 Indeed, President
Bush explicitly stated his aim in Iraq was "build[ing] a
government that represents all Iraqis, a government based
on respect for human rights, economic liberty, and
internationally supervised elections. 3 6 6  According to
361 See United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, supra note 55, at 29.
362 HAGUE REGULATIONS, supra note 5, at art. 43.
363 See GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 77.
364 U.K. Mission to the United Nations, UNSCR 1483-Second
Quarterly Report: Annex, Nov. 21, 2003, available at
http://www.ukun.org/articles show.asp?SaticeType=l 7&ArticleID=
716.
36 President Bush's Remarks, supra note 350.366 id.
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President Bush, "[i]n the twenty-first century, only nations
that share a commitment to protecting basic human rights
and guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be
able to unleash the potential of their people and assure their
future prosperity."3 7 It appears inconsistent for the U.S. to
call for an Iraqi government based on human rights while
the U.S. itself, as an occupying and temporary governing
power, does not observe or promote human rights standards
and development in Iraq.
Humanitarian law was designed to protect the
inhabitants of occupied territories post-conflict through the
application of the rules discussed throughout this article.
The duty to act as usufruct-in the best interest of the
Iraqis-by respecting their private property, national
resources, assets, and way of life, is essential to
achievement of this purpose. The U.S. and U.K. have
violated these rules by placing Iraqis in a situation where
they are held hostage by the unsustainable and corrupt
economic and political system installed by the West.
Because the largest Western MNEs in Iraq have
participated in the formation of reconstruction policy and
strategy, it appears that such companies will also have the
power to manipulate markets and influence politicians and
local communities through the application of their wealth
and power. It should be uncontested that the revenues of
many MNEs investing in Iraq far exceed the gross national
product of many developing nations, and can influence
political and economic events on a global or micro scale.36S
In time, these companies will be able to exert control, or at
least significant influence, over Iraq's political realm as
367 National Security Council, supra note 217.
35 Ruth Wedgwood, Harold K. Jacobson & Allen Gerson,
Peace Building: The Private Sector's Role, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 102, 103
(2001).
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moves by these entities have the power to shatter the Iraqi
economy making it forever dependent upon American
policies.
The American companies in Iraq, including oil
companies, are already a central component of Iraq's
economy, linking the U.S. and Iraq closely, as the
American companies in Iraq are now active participants in
the economic and political processes of the state.369 Such
linkage may effectively neutralize future Iraqi threats to the
U.S., whether it be physical or economic. And so, with the
unlimited repatriation of profits and rich oil fields now
regulated by the U.S., the American economy has a great
deal to gain from the Order 39 reforms at the expense of
Iraq.
369 See generally SORNARAJAH, supra note 65.


